47393TOURISM AND TRAVEL : HOSPITALITY : EVENT MANAGEMENT : PERIODICALS: DIRECTORIES : JOURNALS: RANKING : DIRECTORIES : GUIDES : RESEARCH : LISTS: Tourism and Hospitality Periodicals

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TOURISM AND TRAVEL :

HOSPITALITY :

EVENT MANAGEMENT :

PERIODICALS: DIRECTORIES :

JOURNALS: RANKING :

DIRECTORIES :

GUIDES :

RESEARCH :

LISTS:

Tourism and Hospitality Periodicals

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WEBBIB1415

http://tinyurl.com/pmevjd2

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Tourism and Hospitality Periodicals
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A Selection of Core Journals Important to Tourism

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TOURISM: SUBJECT GUIDE :
TOURISM AND TRAVEL: PERIODICALS:
A Selection of Core Journals Important to Tourism

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This is a list of some important and some interesting journal titles in
the fields of tourism and hospitality and some of the titles in fields
related to tourism and hospitality such as recreation and leisure studies.

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WEBBIB1314

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A Selection of Core Journals Important to Tourism

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Annals of Leisure Research
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ranz20#.UxeXtUo0Jbs
The Annals of Leisure Research (ALR) was established in 1998 as a fully
refereed research journal, published quarterly.

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Annals of Tourism Research
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/annals-of-tourism-research/
Annals of Tourism Research is a social sciences journal focusing upon the
academic perspectives of tourism.

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ASEAN Journal of Tourism and Hospitality Research
http://www.aseanjournal.com
The ASEAN Journal on Hospitality and Tourism is published by Tourism
Research and Development Centre, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia.
The main purpose of this international refereed journal is to advance and
foster tourism and hospitality education, research, and professionalism in
the Southeast Asia region.

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Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research
http://www.hotel-online.com/Trends/AsiaPacificJournal/

APJTR is an official publication of the Asia Pacific Tourism Association

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Australian Leisure Management
http://www.ausleisure.com.au/

For decision makers in the Australasian leisure industry: Amusements,
Aquatics, Attractions, Culture, Entertainment, Events, Fitness,
Recreation, Sport and Tourism.

Published six times a year, Australasian Leisure Management is the
required reading for over 10,500 industry personnel – professionals,
owners, manufacturers and suppliers, investors, governments, academics,
students and others.

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Journal of China Tourism Research
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wctr20/current#.UxeZcEo0Jbs

China Tourism Research (CTR) aims to publish cutting-edge research on
tourism related to and about China. More specifically, it aims to: provide
a forum for exchange of information and ideas among academics and
practitioners who are interested in tourism in China; foster and enhance
research activities that advance the knowledge of tourism; and discuss the
relevance of tourism research to our society.

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Current Issues in Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcit20#.UxeZsko0Jbs

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e-Review of Tourism Research
http://ertr.tamu.edu

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European Journal of Tourism Research
http://ejtr.vumk.eu

The European Journal of Tourism Research (EJTR) is an interdisciplinary
scientific journal in the field of tourism. Its aim is to provide a
platform for discussion of theoretical and empirical problems in tourism.
Publications from all fields, connected with tourism such as management,
marketing, sociology, psychology, geography, political sciences,
mathematics, statistics, anthropology, culture, information technologies
and others are invited.

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Event Management
https://www.cognizantcommunication.com/journal-titles/event-management

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Information Technology and Tourism
http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/
business+information+systems/journal/40558

OR

http://tinyurl.com/kuttnst

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International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=0959-6119

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International Journal of Culture, Tourism and Hospitality Research
http://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=ijcthr

The International Journal of Culture, Tourism, and Hospitality Research
focuses on building bridges in theory, research, and practice across the
inter-related fields of culture, tourism and hospitality. International in
scope and grounded in ‘theory-into-practice’, the journal provides
breadth, depth, provocation and passion in reporting the nuances of
humans’ lived experiences relating to culture, tourism and hospitality.

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International Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Administration
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wjht20/current#.UxedD0o0Jbs

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International Journal of Hospitality Knowledge Management
http://www.inderscience.com/jhome.php?jcode=ijkmth

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International Journal of Tourism Policy and Research
http://www.inderscience.com/jhome.php?jcode=ijtp

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International Journal of Tourism Research
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1522-1970
The International Journal of Tourism Research will promote and enhance
research developments in the field of tourism. The journal will provide an
international platform for debate and dissemination of research findings
whilst also facilitating the discussion of new research areas and
techniques.

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International Travel Law Journal
http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/academic/law/
entunit/norlawpress/jour/trav/?t=1232960458312

OR

http://tinyurl.com/kf2tlpc

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Journal of Ecotourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reco20#.UxeeREo0Jbs

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Journal of Heritage Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjht20#.UxeeZko0Jbs

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Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Education
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/uhat20/current#.UxeezEo0Jbu
Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Education is a refereed,
interdisciplinary quarterly magazine designed to serve the needs of all
levels of hospitality and tourism education through the presentation of
issues and opinions pertinent to the field. The main objective of this
periodical is to facilitate scholarly interchange among hospitality and
tourism educators, industry practitioners and educators from related
disciplines.

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Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research
http://jht.sagepub.com/

The Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research publishes high-quality,
refereed scholarship which advances the knowledge base of the hospitality
and tourism field. Featuring conceptual, empirical research, and applied
research articles as well as book and software reviews, research notes,
industry viewpoints, and conference reviews, JHTR keeps educators,
researchers, and professionals in travel and hospitality up to date with
the latest and most vital findings in the field.

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Journal of Hospitality, Leisure, Sport and Tourism Education
http://tinyurl.com/lpl2vz6

JoHLSTE is the peer-reviewed, international e-journal of the Hospitality,
Leisure, Sport & Tourism Network. JoHLSTE is published twice a year in the
Spring and Autumn and is freely available via this website.
This e-journal aims to promote, enhance and disseminate research, good
practice and innovation in all aspects of education in the hospitality,
leisure, sport and tourism subject areas.

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Journal of Hospitality Marketing and Management
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/whmm20/current#.UxeffUo0Jbs

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Journal of Human Resources in Hospitality and Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/whrh20/current#.UxefnUo0Jbs

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Journal of Interpretation Research
http://tinyurl.com/kuztryv

The purposes of the Journal of Interpretation Research are to communicate
original empirical research dealing with interpretation and to provide a
forum for scholarly discourse about issues facing the profession of
interpretation.

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Journal of Leisurability
http://lin.ca/jol-toc

The Journal of Leisurability is a quarterly journal which publishes
articles concerned with leisure, disability, community, advocacy and
integration.

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Journal of Leisure Research
http://js.sagamorepub.com/jlr

The Journal of Leisure Research is devoted to original investigations that
contribute new knowledge and understanding to the field of leisure
studies. Studies that do not clearly focus on leisure or recreation (i.e.,
do not use leisure or recreation as a central construct) are not suitable
for the Journal.

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Journal of Park and Recreation Administration
http://js.sagamorepub.com/jpra

The Journal of Park and Recreation Administration is the official
publication of the American Academy for Park and Recreation
Administration. The Journal was established by the Academy to bridge the
gap between research and practice for administrators, educators,
consultants, and researchers.

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Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rprt20/current#.UxegeUo0Jbs
The Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events provides a
critical focus on a variety of policy debates relating to the tourism,
leisure and events sectors. Such policy debates will encompass economic,
social, cultural, political and environmental perspectives.

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Journal of Quality Assurance in Hospitality and Tourism
http://www.haworthpressinc.com/store/product.asp?sku=J162

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Journal of Sport and Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjto20/current#.UxegxEo0Jbs

The Journal of Sport & Tourism (JS&T) is a multidisciplinary publication
featuring high quality articles on all aspects of the relationship between
sport and tourism. It welcomes submissions from all relevant subject
areas, such as sport, leisure, physical education and tourism, and from a
wide range of disciplines including, but not confined to: sociology,
psychology, geography, policy studies, management studies, economics and
marketing.

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Journal of Sustainable Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsus20#.Uxeg7ko0Jbs

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Journal of Teaching in Travel and Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wttt20/current#.UxehE0o0Jbs

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Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wttm20/current#.UxehOEo0Jbs

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Journal of Travel Research
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsProdDesc.nav?prodId=Journal200788

The Journal of Travel Research (JTR) is the premier, peer-reviewed
research journal focusing on travel and tourism behavior, management and
development. JTR provides researchers, educators, and professionals
up-to-date, high quality research on behavioral trends and management
theory for one of the world’s largest, most influential and dynamic
industries.

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Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rtcc20/current#.UxehhUo0Jbs

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Journal of Tourism Consumption and Practice
http://www.tourismconsumption.org

The purpose of the Journal of Tourism Consumption and Practice is to
publish original, peer reviewed articles, shorter discussion pieces, book
reviews and conference reports which advance the field of tourism studies
and which broadly address forms of tourism as modes of consumption and
practice.
Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wttm20/current#.Uxeh20o0Jbs
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Journal of Travel Research
http://jtr.sagepub.com/

The Journal of Travel Research (JTR) is the premier, peer-reviewed
research journal focusing on travel and tourism behavior, management and
development.

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Journal of Vacation Marketing
http://jvm.sagepub.com/

The Journal of Vacation Marketing provides an international forum for
applied research papers, case studies, briefings and reviews on the latest
techniques, thinking and practice in the marketing of hotels, travel,
tourism attractions, conventions and destinations.

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Leisure Sciences
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ulsc20/current#.UxeiXko0Jbs

Leisure Sciences presents scientific inquiries into the study of leisure,
recreation, parks, travel, and tourism from a social science perspective.
Articles cover the social and psychological aspects of leisure, planning
for leisure environments, leisure gerontology, travel and tourism
behavior, leisure economics, and urban leisure delivery systems. Also
published are methodological notes and philosophical and policy treatises,
calendars of research meetings and conferences, announcements, and book
reviews.

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Leisure Studies
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rlst20#.UxeihUo0Jbs

Leisure Studies publishes articles of a high standard on all aspects of
leisure studies and from a variety of disciplinary bases, including
sociology, psychology, human geography, planning, economics, etc.

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Loisir et Socit/Society and Leisure
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rles20#.Uxei00o0Jbs

Loisir et Socit / Society and Leisure is a multidisciplinary international
scientific journal specializing in the study of leisure in the broadest
sense of the term and in its multiple aspects. Publishing articles of a
fundamental or methodological nature, it disseminates empirical research
results and serves as a forum for critical debate on the relationships
between free time and the evolution of societies.

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Managing Leisure
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmle20#.Uxei90o0Jbs

This quarterly, refereed journal publishes high quality articles and book
reviews to inform and stimulate discussions relevant to leisure
management. It is designed to appeal to anyone with a serious interest in
contemporary leisure management issues, including academics, practising
managers, consultants, politicians and students. To this end it is
characterised by clearly written, plain English and is accessible to those
without specialist management knowledge.

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Pacific Tourism Review
http://tinyurl.com/llbwpxe
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PASOS – Journal of Tourism and Cultural Heritage
http://www.pasosonline.org/

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Problems of Tourism
http://www.intur.com.pl/itenglish/problems_of_tourism.htm

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Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sjht20/current#.Uxej0Uo0Jbs
Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism aims at initiating and
stimulating hospitality and tourism-related discussions among the academic
community, managers, and decision makers both in the private and public
sectors.

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Studies in Travel Writing
http://www.studiesintravelwriting.com/issues.php

Studies in Travel Writing is an international, refereed journal that
encourages multi- and cross-disciplinary scholar-ship on travel texts.

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TEOROS (Revue de Recherche en Tourisme)
http://teoros.revues.org

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Tourisme and Territoires / Territories and Tourism
http://www.tourter.com

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The Surrey Quarterly Review
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/5766663?q&versionId=6704194

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Tourism and Hospitality Planning and Development
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rthp20#.UxekuUo0Jbs

Tourism and Hospitality: Planning & Development aims to provide a forum
for the publication and dissemination of new and original theoretical and
applied research on tourism, hospitality, planning and development issues,
through fully refereed research papers and to encourage international
dialogue through viewpoint articles, short pieces designed to stimulate
ideas, discussion and/or present work in progress that has not been
developed to a stage suitable for publication as a fully refereed paper.

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Tourism and Hospitality Research
http://thr.sagepub.com

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Tourism Analysis
https://www.cognizantcommunication.com/journal-titles/tourism-analysis

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Tourism, Culture and Communication
https://www.cognizantcommunication.com/journal-titles/tourism-culture-a-communication

OR

http://tinyurl.com/m8p4fc6

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Tourism Economics
http://www.ippublishing.com/te.htm

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Tourism Geographies
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rtxg20/current#.UxellEo0Jbs

The aim of Tourism Geographies is to provide a peer-reviewed forum for the
presentation and discussion of geographic perspectives on tourism and
tourism-related areas of recreation and leisure studies. The plural,
Geographies, is used to express a sensitivity and effort to reach out to
the diversity of perspectives that fall under this subject matter,
including both academic and applied research, regional traditions from
Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and other parts of the world, and
disciplinary approaches from geographers and related professionals, such
as anthropologists and other social scientists, landscape architects,
urban and regional planners, and environmental scientists and managers.

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Tourism and Hospitality Research
http://thr.sagepub.com
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Tourism in Marine Environments
https://www.cognizantcommunication.com/journal-titles/tourism-in-marine-environments

OR

http://tinyurl.com/kdwj2fn

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Tourism Management
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/
journaldescription.cws_home/30472/description#description

A shorter URL for the above link:

http://tinyurl.com/5yo28o

Tourism Management is the leading international journal for all those
concerned with the planning and management of travel and tourism.
Tourism comprises a multitude of activities which together form one of the
world’s fastest growing international sectors. The journal takes an
interdisciplinary approach and includes planning and policy aspects of
international, national and regional tourism as well as specific
management studies.

The journal’s contents reflect its integrative approach – including
primary research articles, discussion of current issues, case studies,
reports, book reviews and listings of recent publications, and forthcoming
meetings. Articles are relevant to both academics and practitioners, and
are the results of anonymous reviews by at least two referees chosen by
the editor for their specialist knowledge.

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Tourism Recreation Research
http://www.trrworld.org

This international journal is focused on research problems in various
recreational environments and hence adopts a multidisciplinary approach.
TRR is a refereed (peer-reviewed) publication and is published thrice a
year. Almost all its issues are thematically oriented and are guest edited
by learned scholars possessing rich expertise in their respective spheres
of tourism knowledge.

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Tourism Review
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1660-5373

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Tourism Review International
https://www.cognizantcommunication.com/
journal-titles/tourism-review-international

A shorter URL for the above link:

http://tinyurl.com/kj478ao

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Tourismos: an International Multidisciplinary Journal of Tourism
http://www.chios.aegean.gr/tourism/journal.htm

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Tourist Studies
http://tou.sagepub.com/

Tourist Studies is a multi-disciplinary journal providing a platform for
the development of critical perspectives on the nature of tourism as a
social phenomenon. Theoretical and multi-disciplinary, Tourist Studies
provides a critical social science approach to the study of the tourist
and the structures which influence tourist behaviour and the
production and reproduction of tourism.

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World Journal of Tourism, Leisure and Sports
http://forskning.regionh.dk/en/journals/
world-journal-of-tourism-leisure-and-
sports(63ea4460-0a05-4637-8feb-5fbb4f666b6c).html

OR

http://tinyurl.com/losw63a

The World Journal of Tourism, Leisure & Sports (WJTLS) is an applied,
internationally oriented hospitality and tourism management journal
designed to help practitioners and researchers stay abreast of the latest
developments in the field as well as facilitate the exchange of ideas. The
journal addresses critical competency areas that will help practitioners
be successful in this growing field now and into the future.

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Tourism and Hospitality Journal and Periodical Lists

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Rating Tourism and Hospitality Journals

Bob McKercher, , Rob Law , Terry Lam

School of Hotel and Tourism Management,

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,

Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China

Received 4 May 2005, Accepted 16 June 2005,

Available online 22 August 2005

doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2005.06.008

Tourism Management

Volume 27, Issue 6, December 2006, Pages 1235–1252

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261517705000841

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Peer-Reviewed Journals in Hospitality, Leisure, Recreation and Tourism

by Kelly Janousek, 1 June 2013.

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/
docs/501/771091/REC_peer-reviewedjournals.htm

OR

http://tinyurl.com/lkfnpxk

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Tourism-related Journals

http://www.gdrc.org/uem/eco-tour/journals.html

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International Center for the Research and Study of Tourism

C.I.R.E.T.

List of Scientific Journals (Tourism and Hospitality)

http://www.ciret-tourism.com/index/listes_revues.html

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List of Journals in Tourism

CREST – Centre for Research Excellence of Services Marketing and Tourism

http://crest-upm.blogspot.com/2008/05/list-of-journals-in-tourism.html

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Publishing In Tourism and Hospitality Journals:

Is The Past a Prelude to the Future?

Bob McKercher, , Vincent Tung

doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2015.03.008

Tourism Management

Volume 50, October 2015, Pages 306–315

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261517715000680

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JOURNAL QUALITY LIST
Fifty-second Edition,
Compiled and edited by Professor Anne-Wil Harzing
The editor welcomes corrections and additions
Email: anne-wil@harzing.com
Website:
http://www.harzing.com

http://www.harzing.com/jql.htm
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Guides, Directories and Analysis of the Periodical or Journal Publications in Tourism and Hospitality

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Hospitality and Tourism Complete (EBSCOHost)

Coverage List

http://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/hjh-coverage.htm

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Subject Title List

Hospitality and Tourism Complete

Full Text Subject Title List

http://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/hjh-subject.htm

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PERIODICALS: ABBREVIATIONS:
A Selected Collection of Sources and Source Listings for Journal Abbreviations
https://sites.google.com/site/generalinternetprintresources/Home/periodicals-abbreviations

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TOURISM AND TRAVEL: PERIODICALS :
HOSPITALITY: PERIODICALS :
PERIODICALS: PEER REVIEWED AND REFEREED:
A Brief Selected Group of Tourism and Hospitality Journal Titles
That are Peer Reviewed or Referreed

https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/Net-Gold/conversations/messages/21142

This is not a comprehensive list, but a starting point for those
conducting research in tourism and hospitality of some major
peer reviewed journals in the related fields of tourism and
hospitality. For those required to use refereed sources in their
research, this checklist can be used in conjunction with the
sources found in their research to winnow out for use those
journals in the citations that are peer reviewed.

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EBSCOHost Databasses: Journal Title Lists
http://www.ebscohost.com/title-lists

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Some Journal Article and Directory Resources

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A Ranking of International Tourism and Hospitality Journals

Pechlaner, Harald

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875

Date: 2004

Volume: 42 Issue: 4 Page: 328

http://tinyurl.com/pl2g2za

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A Content Analysis of Subject Areas and Research Methods

Used in Five Hospitality Management Journals

Seyhmus Baloglu

University of Nevada at Las Vegas,

Lisa Marie Assante

Pennsylvania Institute of Culinary Arts

Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research

Vol. 23, No. 1, 53-70 (1999)

DOI: 10.1177/109634809902300105

http://tinyurl.com/qcc5bxs

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Assessment of Tourism/Hospitality Journals’ Role
in Knowledge Transfer: An Exploratory Study

Frechtling, D. C.

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875 Date: 2004

Volume: 43 Issue: 2 Page: 100

http://tinyurl.com/qazfqla

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Rating tourism and hospitality journals?

MCKERCHER, B

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2006

Volume: 27 Issue: 6 Page: 1235

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2005.06.008

http://tinyurl.com/omxjwl8

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The ranking and rating of academics and journals
in tourism research

RYAN, C

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2005

Volume: 26 Issue: 5 Page: 657

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2004.05.001

http://tinyurl.com/q4sy6tw

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The state of qualitative tourism research

Riley, RW

Journal: Annals of tourism research

ISSN: 0160-7383 Date: 2000

Volume: 27 Issue: 1 Page: 164

http://tinyurl.com/q4pjvwl

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Tourism and Statistics Bibliometric Study

19982002

Palmer, AL

Journal: Annals of tourism research

ISSN: 0160-7383 Date: 2005

Volume: 32 Issue: 1 Page: 167

DOI: 10.1016/j.annals.2004.06.003

http://tinyurl.com/oq5jprx

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An Analysis of Hospitality and Tourism Research:
Institutional Contributions

Jogaratnam, G.

Journal: Journal of hospitality & tourism research

(Washington, D.C.)

ISSN: 1096-3480 Date: 2005

Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Page: 356

DOI: 10.1177/1096348005276929

http://tinyurl.com/nmg4sgh

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Ranking, rating and scoring of tourism journals:
Interdisciplinary challenges and innovations

JAMAL, T

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 1 Page: 66

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.04.001

http://tinyurl.com/oz83b4q

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Finding the Hospitality Industry?

Or Finding Hospitality Schools

of Thought?

Jones, P

Journal: The journal of hospitality,

leisure, sport & tourism education

ISSN: 1473-8376 Date: 2004

Volume: 3 Issue: 1 Page: 33

http://tinyurl.com/nq5y26v

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Critical turn in tourism studies: innovative research methodologies

Authors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Editors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Contributors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Edition illustrated

Publisher Elsevier, 2007

ISBN 0080450989, 9780080450988

Length 405 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / General

Business & Economics / Industries / General

Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Tourism

Tourism/ Research

Tourism/ Study and teaching (Higher)

Qualitative research in tourism

Jenny Phillimore, Lisa Goodson

2004 – 333 pages

http://tinyurl.com/m6c86f

http://tinyurl.com/pd7kuwv

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The SAGE Handbook of Hospitality Management

Authors Roy C. Wood, Bob Brotherton

Editors Roy C. Wood, Bob Brotherton

Contributor Bob Brotherton

Edition illustrated

Publisher Sage, 2008

ISBN 1412900255, 9781412900256

Length 555 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Business & Economics / Management

Hospitality industry

Management

http://tinyurl.com/pbrwkbx

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Research methods for leisure and tourism:
a practical guide

Author Anthony James Veal

Edition 3, illustrated

Publisher Prentice Hall/Financial Times, 2006

ISBN 0273682008, 9780273682004

Length 421 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Leisure

Leisure industry

Leisure/ Research

Research

Research/ Methodology

Tourism

Tourism/ Research

http://tinyurl.com/pnbol5h

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Event tourism: Definition, evolution, and research

Author: Getz, Donald

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 06/2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Page: 403 – 428

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.07.017

http://tinyurl.com/p6p7yux

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Getz, D.

(2000).

Developing a research agenda
for the event management field.

Events beyond, 10-21.

http://tinyurl.com/p6p7yux

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Ranking, rating and scoring of tourism journals:

Interdisciplinary challenges and innovations

Author: Jamal, Tazim

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 02/2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 1 Page: 66 – 78

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.04.001

http://tinyurl.com/oz83b4q

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Assessment of Tourism/Hospitality Journals’ Role

in Knowledge Transfer: An Exploratory Study

Author: Frechtling, D. C.

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875 Date: 11/2004

Volume: 43 Issue: 2 Page: 100 – 107

DOI: 10.1177/0047287504268230

http://tinyurl.com/qazfqla

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An overview of Internet-based surveys

in hospitality and tourism journals

Author: Hung, Kam

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 08/2011

Volume: 32 Issue: 4 Page: 717 – 724

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2010.05.027

http://tinyurl.com/o443hes

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Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory

A Fee Based Directory of Periodicals
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Encyclopedia of Business Information Sources
http://find.galegroup.com/gdl/help/GDLeDirEBISHelp.html
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Australian Business Deans Council –
Journal Ratings List Tourism
http://www.abdc.edu.au/download.php?id=76204,189,1

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Sustainable Tourism
Tourism-related Journals
The following is a list of journals that
focus on tourism and related topics,
including leasure and hospitality,
recreation, destination management,
heritage, environment etc.
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Hospitality and Tourism Complete
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Selected Periodical Articles About Tourism and Hospitality Journals

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A Ranking of International Tourism and Hospitality Journals

Pechlaner, Harald

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875

Date: 2004

Volume: 42 Issue: 4 Page: 328

http://tinyurl.com/pl2g2za

.

A Content Analysis of Subject Areas and Research Methods

Used in Five Hospitality Management Journals

Seyhmus Baloglu

University of Nevada at Las Vegas,

Lisa Marie Assante

Pennsylvania Institute of Culinary Arts

Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research

Vol. 23, No. 1, 53-70 (1999)

DOI: 10.1177/109634809902300105

http://tinyurl.com/qcc5bxs

.

Assessment of Tourism/Hospitality Journals’ Role
in Knowledge Transfer: An Exploratory Study

Frechtling, D. C.

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875 Date: 2004

Volume: 43 Issue: 2 Page: 100

http://tinyurl.com/qazfqla

.

Rating tourism and hospitality journals?

MCKERCHER, B

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2006

Volume: 27 Issue: 6 Page: 1235

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2005.06.008

http://tinyurl.com/omxjwl8

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The ranking and rating of academics and journals
in tourism research

RYAN, C

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2005

Volume: 26 Issue: 5 Page: 657

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2004.05.001

http://tinyurl.com/q4sy6tw

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The state of qualitative tourism research

Riley, RW

Journal: Annals of tourism research

ISSN: 0160-7383 Date: 2000

Volume: 27 Issue: 1 Page: 164

http://tinyurl.com/q4pjvwl

.

Tourism and Statistics Bibliometric Study

19982002

Palmer, AL

Journal: Annals of tourism research

ISSN: 0160-7383 Date: 2005

Volume: 32 Issue: 1 Page: 167

DOI: 10.1016/j.annals.2004.06.003

http://tinyurl.com/oq5jprx

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An Analysis of Hospitality and Tourism Research:
Institutional Contributions

Jogaratnam, G.

Journal: Journal of hospitality & tourism research

(Washington, D.C.)

ISSN: 1096-3480 Date: 2005

Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Page: 356

DOI: 10.1177/1096348005276929

http://tinyurl.com/nmg4sgh

.

Ranking, rating and scoring of tourism journals:
Interdisciplinary challenges and innovations

JAMAL, T

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 1 Page: 66

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.04.001

http://tinyurl.com/oz83b4q

.

Finding the Hospitality Industry?

Or Finding Hospitality Schools

of Thought?

Jones, P

Journal: The journal of hospitality,

leisure, sport & tourism education

ISSN: 1473-8376 Date: 2004

Volume: 3 Issue: 1 Page: 33

http://tinyurl.com/nq5y26v

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Critical turn in tourism studies: innovative research methodologies

Authors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Editors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Contributors Irena Ateljevic, Annette Pritchard,

Nigel Morgan

Edition illustrated

Publisher Elsevier, 2007

ISBN 0080450989, 9780080450988

Length 405 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / General

Business & Economics / Industries / General

Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Tourism

Tourism/ Research

Tourism/ Study and teaching (Higher)

Qualitative research in tourism

Jenny Phillimore, Lisa Goodson

2004 – 333 pages

http://tinyurl.com/m6c86f

http://tinyurl.com/pd7kuwv

.

The SAGE Handbook of Hospitality Management

Authors Roy C. Wood, Bob Brotherton

Editors Roy C. Wood, Bob Brotherton

Contributor Bob Brotherton

Edition illustrated

Publisher Sage, 2008

ISBN 1412900255, 9781412900256

Length 555 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Business & Economics / Management

Hospitality industry

Management

http://tinyurl.com/pbrwkbx

.

Research methods for leisure and tourism:
a practical guide

Author Anthony James Veal

Edition 3, illustrated

Publisher Prentice Hall/Financial Times, 2006

ISBN 0273682008, 9780273682004

Length 421 pages

Subjects Business & Economics / Industries /

Hospitality, Travel & Tourism

Leisure

Leisure industry

Leisure/ Research

Research

Research/ Methodology

Tourism

Tourism/ Research

http://tinyurl.com/pnbol5h

.

Event tourism: Definition, evolution, and research

Author: Getz, Donald

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 06/2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Page: 403 – 428

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.07.017

http://tinyurl.com/p6p7yux

.

Getz, D.

(2000).

Developing a research agenda
for the event management field.

Events beyond, 10-21.

http://tinyurl.com/p6p7yux

.

Ranking, rating and scoring of tourism journals:

Interdisciplinary challenges and innovations

Author: Jamal, Tazim

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 02/2008

Volume: 29 Issue: 1 Page: 66 – 78

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2007.04.001

http://tinyurl.com/oz83b4q

.

Assessment of Tourism/Hospitality Journals’ Role

in Knowledge Transfer: An Exploratory Study

Author: Frechtling, D. C.

Journal: Journal of travel research

ISSN: 0047-2875 Date: 11/2004

Volume: 43 Issue: 2 Page: 100 – 107

DOI: 10.1177/0047287504268230

http://tinyurl.com/qazfqla

.

An overview of Internet-based surveys

in hospitality and tourism journals

Author: Hung, Kam

Journal: Tourism management (1982)

ISSN: 0261-5177 Date: 08/2011

Volume: 32 Issue: 4 Page: 717 – 724

DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2010.05.027

http://tinyurl.com/o443hes

Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory

A Fee Based Directory of Periodicals

Citations and impact of ISI tourism and hospitality journals

Chia-Lin Changa, b, , , Michael McAleerc, d, e, f

doi:10.1016/j.tmp.2011.08.001

Tourism Management Perspectives

Volume 1, January 2012, Pages 2–8

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221197361100002X

Citations and Impact of ISI Tourism and Hospitality Journals

Chia-Lin Changa, b, , , Michael McAleerc, d, e, f

doi:10.1016/j.tmp.2011.08.001

Tourism Management Perspectives

Volume 1, January 2012, Pages 2–8

http://tinyurl.com/q4otnmu

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221197361100002X

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A Ranking of International Tourism and Hospitality Journals

Harald Pechlaner, Anita Zehrer,

Kurt Matzler,Dagmar Abfalter

doi: 10.1177/0047287504263026

Journal of Travel Research May 2004 vol. 42 no. 4 328-332

http://tinyurl.com/pl2g2za

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Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory
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Encyclopedia of business information sources

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Tourism Futures :
CIRET’ S LIST OF JOURNALS
List of Scientific Journals
Encyclopedia of Worldwide Tourism Research
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PERIODICALS: ABBREVIATIONS :
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A Selected Webliography of Journal Abbreviation Sources
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Ranking and Evaluation of Tourism and Hospitality Journals:
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47393TOURISM AND TRAVEL : HOSPITALITY : EVENT MANAGEMENT : PERIODICALS: DIRECTORIES : JOURNALS: RANKING : DIRECTORIES : GUIDES : RESEARCH : LISTS: Tourism and Hospitality Periodicals

t: MARRIAGE: SAME SEX MARRIAGE : UNITED STATES: GOVERNMENT: COURTS: SUPREME COURT : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. [FULL TEXT]

.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–556. Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015*

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex cou­ples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that re­spondent state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by deny­ing them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners’ favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.

Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a mar­riage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawful­ly licensed and performed out-of-State. Pp. 3–28.

(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court. Pp. 3–10.

(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons ofthe opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the respond­ents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extend­ed to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to de­value marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities, as illustrated by the pe­

—————— *Together with No. 14–562, Tanco et al. v. Haslam, Governor of Ten­nessee, et al., No. 14–571, DeBoer et al. v. Snyder, Governor of Michigan, et al., and No. 14–574, Bourke et al. v. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, also on certiorari to the same court. 2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES
Syllabus

titioners’ own experiences. Pp. 3–6.

(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages and the aban­donment of the law of coverture, have worked deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once viewed as essential. These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution. Changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as anillness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments al­lowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts in public atti­tudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal dis­course of the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, which upheld a Georgia law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 575. In 2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570

U. S. ___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue. Pp. 6–

10.

(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a mar­riage between two people of the same sex. Pp. 10–27.

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choic­es defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying in­terests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord the mits respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquirybut do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals dis­cord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received le­gal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388

U. S. 1, 12, invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95, held that prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship in­3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Syllabus

volving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial fed­eral question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex cou­ples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454. This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may ex­ercise the right to marry. Pp. 10–12.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the rea­sons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s rel­evant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding mar­riage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388

U. S., at 12. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.

A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The inti­mate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of mar­ried couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at 485, and was acknowl­edged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extend­ing beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense. See Lawrence, supra, at 567.

A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510. Without the recognition, stability, and pre­dictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issuethus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Prece­dent protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to procreate. 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Syllabus

Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference be­tween same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle,yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instabilitymany opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s soci­ety, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central mean­ing of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp. 12–18.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co­extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court in­voked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause;and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, where the Court invalidat­ed a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal under­standings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental insti­tutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450

U. S. 455, 460–461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these con­stitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liber­ty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality.The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and con­tinuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbi­ans. Pp. 18–22.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protec­

5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Syllabus

tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these cas­es are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex cou­ples. Pp. 22–23.

(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further legisla­tion, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive liti­gation in state and federal courts have led to an enhanced under­standing of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that de­mocracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a funda­mental right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right. Though it was eventually repudi­ated, men and women suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amend­ment. The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they present to the Court, which has a duty to address these claims and answer these questions. Respondents’ argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples’ decisions about mar­riage and parenthood. Finally, the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths. Pp. 23–27.

(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sexmarriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sexcharacter. Pp. 27–28.

772 F. 3d 388, reversed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach,a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms andconditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.

I These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union be­tween one man and one woman. See, e.g., Mich. Const., Art. I, §25; Ky. Const. §233A; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const., Art. XI, §18. The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased. The respondents arestate officials responsible for enforcing the laws in ques­tion. The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed inanother State, given full recognition.Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home States. Each District Court ruled in their favor. Citations to those cases are in Appendix A, infra. The respondents appealed the decisions against them to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It consolidated the cases and reversed the judg­ments of the District Courts. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that a State has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of State. The petitioners sought certiorari. This Court granted review, limited to two questions. 574 U. S. ___ (2015). The first, presented by the cases from Michigan and Ken­tucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires aState to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. The second, presented by the cases from Ohio, 3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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Tennessee, and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Four­teenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which doesgrant that right.

II Before addressing the principles and precedents that govern these cases, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court.

A From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent im­portance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secu­lar realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations. The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into rela­tives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, “The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family.” See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913).There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The re­spondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and through­out the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners’ claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners’ contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage,the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities.And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex mar­riage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

Recounting the circumstances of three of these cases illustrates the urgency of the petitioners’ cause from their perspective. Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in the Ohio case, met John Arthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a life together, establishing a last­ing, committed relation. In 2011, however, Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS.This debilitating disease is progressive, with no known cure. Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to commit to one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual promise, they traveled from 5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. It was difficult for Arthur to move, and so the couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained on the tarmac in Baltimore. Three months later, Arthur died. Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in death, a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems “hurtful for the rest of time.” App. in No. 14–556 etc., p. 38. He brought suit to be shown as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.

April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case from Michigan. They celebrated a commitment cere­mony to honor their permanent relation in 2007. They both work as nurses, DeBoer in a neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In 2009, DeBoer and Rowse fos­tered and then adopted a baby boy. Later that same year,they welcomed another son into their family. The new baby, born prematurely and abandoned by his biological mother, required around-the-clock care. The next year, a baby girl with special needs joined their family. Michigan,however, permits only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt, so each child can have only one woman as his or her legal parent. If an emergency were to arise, schools and hospitals may treat the three children as if they had only one parent. And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to adopt. This couple seeks relief from the continuing uncer­tainty their unmarried status creates in their lives.

Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partner Thomas Kostura, co-plaintiffs in the Tennessee case, fell in love. In 2011, DeKoe received orders to deploy to Afghanistan. Before leaving, he and Kostura married in New York. A week later, DeKoe began his deployment,which lasted for almost a year. When he returned, the two 6 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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settled in Tennessee, where DeKoe works full-time for the Army Reserve. Their lawful marriage is stripped from them whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing as they travel across state lines. DeKoe, who served this Nation to preserve the freedom the Constitu­tion protects, must endure a substantial burden.

The cases now before the Court involve other petitioners as well, each with their own experiences. Their stories reveal that they seek not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives, or honor their spouses’ memory, joined by its bond.

B The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both conti­nuity and change. That institution—even as confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time. For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrange­ment by the couple’s parents based on political, religious, and financial concerns; but by the time of the Nation’s founding it was understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman. See N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 9–17 (2000); S. Coontz, Marriage, A History 15–16 (2005). As the role and status of women changed, the institution further evolved. Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. See 1 W. Blackstone, Com­mentaries on the Laws of England 430 (1765). As women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned. See Brief for Historians of Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae 16–19. These and other developments in the institution of marriage over the past centuries were not mere superficial changes. 7 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) Opinion of the Court

Rather, they worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essen­tial. See generally N. Cott, Public Vows; S. Coontz, Mar­riage; H. Hartog, Man & Wife in America: A History (2000).

These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage. Indeed, changed understand­ings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new genera­tions, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experiences with the rights of gays and lesbians. Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief often embodied in the criminal law. For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by same-sex couples of what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken. Even when a greater awareness of the humanity and integrity of homosexual persons came in the period after World War II, the argu­ment that gays and lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread social con­ventions. Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in many States. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from most government employment, barred from military service, excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened in their rights to associate. See Brief for Organ­ization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae 5–28.

For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was treated as an illness. When the American Psychiatric Association published the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder, a position adhered to until 1973. See Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil 8 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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Rights, 1973, in 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 497 (1974). Only in more recent years have psychiatrists and others recog­nized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable. See Brief for Ameri­can Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7–17.

In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead more open and public lives and to establish families. This development was followed by a quite extensive dis­cussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance. As a result, questions about the rights of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where the issue could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law.

This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal status of homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986). There it upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia law deemed to criminalize certain homosexual acts. Ten years later, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), the Court invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or politi­cal subdivision of the State from protecting persons against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Then, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers, holding that laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558,

575.

Against this background, the legal question of same-sex marriage arose. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaii’s law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Con­stitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws that marriage is 9 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) Opinion of the Court

defined as a union between opposite-sex partners. So too in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 110 Stat. 2419, defining marriage for all federal-law purposes as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.” 1 U. S. C. §7.

The new and widespread discussion of the subject led other States to a different conclusion. In 2003, the Su­preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the State’s Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003). After that ruling,some additional States granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through judicial or legislative processes. These decisions and statutes are cited in Appendix B, infra. Two Terms ago, in United States v. Windsor, 570

U. S. ___ (2013), this Court invalidated DOMA to the extent it barred the Federal Government from treating same-sex marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the State where they were licensed. DOMA, the Court held, impermissibly disparaged those same-sex couples“who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States Courts of Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the judicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions, without scorn­ful or disparaging commentary, courts have written a substantial body of law considering all sides of these is­sues. That case law helps to explain and formulate the underlying principles this Court now must consider. With the exception of the opinion here under review and one other, see Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455

F. 3d 859, 864–868 (CA8 2006), the Courts of Appeals have held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates the Constitution. There also have been many 10 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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thoughtful District Court decisions addressing same-sexmarriage—and most of them, too, have concluded same-sex couples must be allowed to marry. In addition the highest courts of many States have contributed to this ongoing dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State Constitutions. These state and federal judicial opinions are cited in Appendix A, infra.

After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussions that attended these public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage. See Office of the Atty. Gen. of Maryland, The State of Marriage Equality in America, State-by-State Supp. (2015).

III Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The fundamental liberties protected by this Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147–149 (1968). In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486 (1965). The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, “has not been reduced to any formula.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying inter­ests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. See ibid. That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad princi­ples rather than specific requirements. History and tradi­11 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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tion guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. See Lawrence, supra, at 572. That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.

The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimen­sions, and so they entrusted to future generations a char­ter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a re­ceived legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali­dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978), which held the right to marry was bur­dened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Okla­homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923).

It cannot be denied that this Court’s cases describing the right to marry presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners. The Court, like many institutions, 12 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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has made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part. This was evident in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question.

Still, there are other, more instructive precedents. This Court’s cases have expressed constitutional principles of broader reach. In defining the right to marry these cases have identified essential attributes of that right based inhistory, tradition, and other constitutional liberties inher­ent in this intimate bond. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 574; Turner, supra, at 95; Zablocki, supra, at 384; Loving, supra, at 12; Griswold, supra, at 486. And in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long pro­tected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454; Poe, su­pra, at 542–553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sexcouples may exercise the right to marry. The four princi­ples and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitutionapply with equal force to same-sex couples.

A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding con­nection between marriage and liberty is why Loving inval­idated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki, supra, at 384 (observing Loving held “the right to marry is of fun­damental importance for all individuals”). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procrea­tion, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Law­rence, supra, at 574. Indeed, the Court has noted it would 13 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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be contradictory “to recognize a right of privacy with re­spect to other matters of family life and not with respect tothe decision to enter the relationship that is the founda­tion of the family in our society.” Zablocki, supra, at 386.

Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts hasexplained, because “it fulfils yearnings for security, safehaven, and connection that express our common human- ity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and thedecision whether and whom to marry is among life’s mo­mentous acts of self-definition.” Goodridge, 440 Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955.

The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. See Wind­sor, 570 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 22–23). There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such pro­found choices. Cf. Loving, supra, at 12 (“[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State”).

A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. This point was central to Griswold

v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at

485. Suggesting that marriage is a right “older than the

Bill of Rights,” Griswold described marriage this way: “Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of be­ing sacred. It is an association that promotes a way oflife, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 14 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. ” Id., at 486.

And in Turner, the Court again acknowledged the inti­mate association protected by this right, holding prisoners could not be denied the right to marry because their com­mitted relationships satisfied the basic reasons why mar­riage is a fundamental right. See 482 U. S., at 95–96. The right to marry thus dignifies couples who “wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.” Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14). Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.

As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association. Lawrence invalidated laws that made same-sex intimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that“[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate con­duct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” 539

U. S., at 567. But while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.

A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and edu­cation. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer, 262 U. S., at 399. The Court has recognized these connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: “[T]he right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 384 15 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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(quoting Meyer, supra, at 399). Under the laws of the several States, some of marriage’s protections for children and families are material. But marriage also confers more profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal struc­ture to their parents’ relationship, marriage allows chil­dren “to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23). Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests. See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae 22–27.

As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of chil­dren are presently being raised by such couples. See Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae 4. Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents, see id., at 5. This provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families.

Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus con­flicts with a central premise of the right to marry. With­out the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the signifi­cant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23).

That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. An ability,desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. In light of 16 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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precedent protecting the right of a married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commit­ment to procreate. The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.

Fourth and finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this truth on his travels through the United States almost two cen­turies ago:
“There is certainly no country in the world where the tie of marriage is so much respected as in America . . . [W]hen the American retires from the turmoil of pub­lic life to the bosom of his family, he finds in it the im­age of order and of peace . . . . [H]e afterwards carries [that image] with him into public affairs.” 1 Democracy in America 309 (H. Reeve transl., rev. ed. 1990).

In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888), the Court echoed de Tocqueville, explaining that marriage is “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.” Mar­riage, the Maynard Court said, has long been “‘a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.’” Id., at 213. This idea has been reiterated even as the institution has evolved in substantial ways over time, superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, and race once thought by many to be essential. See generally

N. Cott, Public Vows. Marriage remains a building block of our national community.

For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married cou­ples, they have throughout our history made marriage the 17 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) Opinion of the Court

basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, bene­fits, and responsibilities. These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evi­dence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority;adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visita­tion rules. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6–9; Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 8–29. Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ – ___ (slip op., at 15–16). The States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.

There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intoler­able in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it,exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that knowledge must come 18 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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the recognition that laws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.

Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate fram­ing of the issue, the respondents refer to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997), which called for a “‘careful description’” of fundamental rights. They assert the petitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent “right to same-sex mar­riage.” Brief for Respondent in No. 14–556, p. 8. Glucks­berg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a “right to inter­racial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.”Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right. See also Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 752–773 (Souter,J., concurring in judgment); id., at 789–792 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgments).

That principle applies here. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians. See Loving 388 U. S., at 12; Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 566–567.

The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources 19 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understand­ing of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises,and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes en- acted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couplesseek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sexcouples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.

The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co­extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particu­lar case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. See M. L. B., 519 U. S., at 120– 121; id., at 128–129 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judg­ment); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 665 (1983). This interrelation of the two principles furthers our under­standing of what freedom is and must become.

The Court’s cases touching upon the right to marry reflect this dynamic. In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Court 20 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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first declared the prohibition invalid because of its un­equal treatment of interracial couples. It stated: “There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.” 388 U. S., at 12. With this link to equal protection the Court proceeded to hold the prohibition offended central precepts of liberty: “To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these stat­utes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” Ibid. The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right became more clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of the hurt that re­sulted from laws barring interracial unions.

The synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in Zablocki. There the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the chal­lenged law, which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support payments from marrying without judicial approval. The equal protection analysis depended in central part on the Court’s holding that the law burdened a right “of fundamental importance.” 434

U. S., at 383. It was the essential nature of the marriage right, discussed at length in Zablocki, see id., at 383–387, that made apparent the law’s incompatibility with re­quirements of equality. Each concept—liberty and equal protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.

Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal un­derstandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. To take but one period, this occurred with respect to marriage in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Not­withstanding the gradual erosion of the doctrine of cover­21 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

ture, see supra, at 6, invidious sex-based classifications in marriage remained common through the mid-20th cen­tury. See App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed, O. T. 1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State’s law, for example, pro- vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, either for her own protection, or for her benefit.” Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935). Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection prin­ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Like Loving and Zablocki, these precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage,vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.

Other cases confirm this relation between liberty and equality. In M. L. B. v. S. L. J., the Court invalidated under due process and equal protection principles a stat­ute requiring indigent mothers to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental rights. See 519

U. S., at 119–124. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court in­voked both principles to invalidate a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons but not married persons. See 405 U. S., at 446–454. And in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court invali­dated under both principles a law that allowed steriliz a ­22 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

tion of habitual criminals. See 316 U. S., at 538–543.

In Lawrence the Court acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See 539 U. S., at

575. Although Lawrence elaborated its holding under the Due Process Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to remedy, the continuing inequality that resulted from laws making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime against the State. See ibid. Lawrence therefore drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define and pro­tect the rights of gays and lesbians, holding the State“cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” Id., at 578.

This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exer­cising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g., Zablocki, supra, at 383–388; Skinner, 316 U. S., at 541.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No 23 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws chal­lenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.

IV There may be an initial inclination in these cases to proceed with caution—to await further legislation, litiga­tion, and debate. The respondents warn there has been in sufficient democratic discourse before deciding an issue so basic as the definition of marriage. In its ruling on the cases now before this Court, the majority opinion for the Court of Appeals made a cogent argument that it would be appropriate for the respondents’ States to await further public discussion and political measures before licensing same-sex marriages. See DeBoer, 772 F. 3d, at 409. Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argument acknowledges. There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There has been extensive litigation instate and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra. Judicial opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As more than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in American life—state and local governments, the military, large and small businesses,labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement,civic groups, professional organizations, and universities—have devoted substantial attention to the question. This has led to an enhanced understanding of the issue—an understanding reflected in the arguments now presented 24 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

for resolution as a matter of constitutional law.

Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democ­racy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights. Last Term, a plurality of this Court reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle in Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), noting the “right of citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then, through the political process,act in concert to try to shape the course of their own times.” Id., at ___ – ___ (slip op., at 15–16). Indeed, it is most often through democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in our lives. But as Schuette also said, “[t]he freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Thus, when the rights of persons are violated, “the Constitution requires redress by the courts,” notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decisionmaking. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17).This holds true even when protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.

The dynamic of our constitutional system is that indi­viduals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation’s courts are open to in­jured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea of the Constitution “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish themas legal principles to be applied by the courts.” West Vir­ginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).This is why “fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Ibid. 25 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

It is of no moment whether advocates of same-sex mar­riage now enjoy or lack momentum in the democratic process. The issue before the Court here is the legal ques­tion whether the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry.

This is not the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cautious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental rights. In Bowers, a bare majority upheld a law criminalizing same-sex intimacy. See 478 U. S., at 186, 190–195. That approach might have been viewed as a cautious endorsement of the democratic process, which had only just begun to consider the rights of gays andlesbians. Yet, in effect, Bowers upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right and caused them pain and humiliation. As evidenced by the dissents in that case, the facts and principles necessary to a correct holding were known to the Bowers Court. See id., at 199 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,JJ., dissenting); id., at 214 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). That is why Lawrence held Bowers was “not correct when it was decided.” 539 U. S., at 578. Although Bowers was eventually repudiated in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in the interim, and the substantial effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. Dignitary wounds cannot always be healed with the stroke of a pen.

A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect—and, like Bowers, would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners’ stories make clear the urgency of the issue they present to the Court. James Obergefell now asks whether Ohio can erase his marriage to John Arthur for all time. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now ask whether Michigan may continue to deny them the certainty and stability all mothers desire to protect their children, and for them and their children the childhood years will pass all too soon. Ijpe DeKoe and 26 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

Thomas Kostura now ask whether Tennessee can deny toone who has served this Nation the basic dignity of recog­nizing his New York marriage. Properly presented with the petitioners’ cases, the Court has a duty to address these claims and answer these questions.

Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals—a disagreement that caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal law—the Court granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. Were the Court to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it would teach the Nation that these laws are in accord with our society’s most basic compact. Were the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.

The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages. This may occur, the re­spondents contend, because licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between natural procreation and marriage. That argument, however, rests on a counterin­tuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s decision making pro­cesses regarding marriage and parenthood. Decisions about whether to marry and raise children are based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex cou­ple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193, 1223 (CA10 2014) (“[I]t is wholly illogical to believe that state recognition of the love and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sex couples”). The respondents have not shown a foundation for the conclusion that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes they 27 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

describe. Indeed, with respect to this asserted basis for excluding same-sex couples from the right to marry, it is appropriate to observe these cases involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.

Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advo­cate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine pre­cepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to theirlives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and search­ing debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.

V These cases also present the question whether the Con­stitution requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. As made clear by the caseof Obergefell and Arthur, and by that of DeKoe and Kostura, the recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm on same-sex couples.Being married in one State but having that valid mar­riage denied in another is one of “the most perplexing and distressing complication[s]” in the law of domestic rela­tions. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted). Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and pro­ 28 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

mote instability and uncertainty. For some couples, even an ordinary drive into a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state lines. In lightof the fact that many States already allow same-sex mar­riage—and hundreds of thousands of these marriages already have occurred—the disruption caused by there cognition bans is significant and ever-growing.

As counsel for the respondents acknowledged at argu­ment, if States are required by the Constitution to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages performed else­where are undermined. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 44. The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex cou­ples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

* * * No union is more profound than marriage, for it embod­ies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people be­come something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be con­demned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civiliza­tion’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered. Opinion of the Court Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 29

Appendix A to opinion of the Court

APPENDICES A State and Federal Judicial Decisions Addressing Same-Sex Marriage

United States Courts of Appeals Decisions

Adams v. Howerton, 673 F. 2d 1036 (CA9 1982)

Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F. 3d 673 (CA9 2006)

Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859 (CA8 2006)

Windsor v. United States, 699 F. 3d 169 (CA2 2012)

Massachusetts v. Department of Health and Human Services, 682 F. 3d 1 (CA1 2012)

Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052 (CA9 2012)

Latta v. Otter, 771 F. 3d 456 (CA9 2014)

Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F. 3d 648 (CA7 2014)

Bishop v. Smith, 760 F. 3d 1070 (CA10 2014)

Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F. 3d 352 (CA4 2014)

Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193 (CA10 2014)

DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (CA6 2014)

Latta v. Otter, 779 F. 3d 902 (CA9 2015) (O’Scannlain,J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)

United States District Court Decisions

Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (CD Cal. 1980) Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 290

F. Supp. 2d 1004 (Neb. 2003) Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (Neb. 2005) Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (MD Fla. 2005) Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (CD Cal. 2005) Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (ND Okla. 2006) Opinion of the Court 30 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES
Appendix A to opinion of the Court
Massachusetts v. Department of Health and Human

Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (Mass. 2010) Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d

374 (Mass. 2010) Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (ND Cal.

2010) Dragovich v. Department of Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d
1178 (ND Cal. 2011) Golinski v. Office of Personnel Management, 824

F. Supp. 2d 968 (ND Cal. 2012) Dragovich v. Department of Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d
944 (ND Cal. 2012) Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (SDNY
2012) Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 881

F. Supp. 2d 294 (Conn. 2012) Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (Haw. 2012) Nov. 14, 2013) Gray v. Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984 (ND Ill. 2013) Lee v. Orr, 2013 WL 6490577 (ND Ill., Dec. 10, 2013) 1252 (ND Okla. 2014) Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (WD Ky. 2014) Lee v. Orr, 2014 WL 683680 (ND Ill., Feb. 21, 2014) Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (ED Va. 2014) De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (WD Tex. 2014) Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (MD Tenn. 2014) DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (ED Mich. 2014) Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (SD Ohio 2014) Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (Idaho 2014)
Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (Nev. 2012) Merritt v. Attorney General, 2013 WL 6044329 (MD La.,

Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (Utah 2013) Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (SD Ohio
2013) Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d Opinion of the Court 31 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (Ore. 2014) Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (Utah 2014) Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (MD Pa. 2014) Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (WD Wis. 2014) Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (SD Ind. 2014) Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (WD Ky. 2014) Burns v. Hickenlooper, 2014 WL 3634834 (Colo., July 23, 2014) Bowling v. Pence, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (SD Ind. 2014) Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (ND Fla. 2014) Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (ED La. 2014) General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resing­er, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (WDNC 2014) Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (Alaska 2014) Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695 (MDNC 2014) 5320642 (Ariz., Oct. 17, 2014) (Kan., Nov. 4, 2014) (SD W. Va., Nov. 7, 2014) Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (S.C. 2014) Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (S.C. 2014) 6685391 (ED Ark., Nov. 25, 2014) Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 6680570 (SD Miss., Nov. 25, 2014) Inniss v. Aderhold, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 300593 (ND Ga., Jan. 8, 2015)
Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (Ariz. 2014) Connolly v. Jeanes, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL

Guzzo v. Mead, 2014 WL 5317797 (Wyo., Oct. 17, 2014) Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157 (PR
2014) Marie v. Moser, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5598128
Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923 (WD Mo. 2014) McGee v. Cole, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802665

Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (Mont. 2014) Jernigan v. Crane, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL
Appendix A to opinion of the Court Opinion of the Court 32 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Appendix A to opinion of the Court

Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862 (S. D., 2015)

Caspar v. Snyder, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 224741(ED Mich., Jan. 15, 2015)

Searcey v. Strange, 2015 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 7776 (SD Ala., Jan. 23, 2015)

Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (SD Ala. 2015)

Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (Neb. 2015)

State Highest Court Decisions

Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N. W. 2d 185 (1971) Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973) Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44 (1993) Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A. 2d 307 (D. C. 1995) Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A. 2d 864 (1999) Brause v. State, 21 P. 3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (ripeness) Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003) In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 802 N. E. 2d 565 (2004) Li v. State, 338 Or. 376, 110 P. 3d 91 (2005) Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health,446 Mass. 350, 844 N. E. 2d 623 (2006) Lewis v. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 908 A. 2d 196 (2006) Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P. 3d 963 (2006) Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N. Y. 3d 338, 855 N. E. 2d 1 (2006) Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A. 2d 571 (2007) In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P. 3d 384 (2008) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008) Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 207 P. 3d 48 (2009) Opinion of the Court 33 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009) Griego v. Oliver, 2014–NMSC–003, ___ N. M. ___, 316

P. 3d 865 (2013) Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N. J. 314, 79 A. 3d 1036 (2013)
Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute, ___ So. 3d ___, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala., Mar. 3, 2015) Opinion of the Court 34 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Appendix B to opinion of the Court

B State Legislation and Judicial DecisionsLegalizing Same-Sex Marriage

Legislation

Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, §129 (Cum. Supp. 2014)

D. C. Act No. 18–248, 57 D. C. Reg. 27 (2010) Haw. Rev. Stat. §572 –1 (2006) and 2013 Cum. Supp.) Ill. Pub. Act No. 98–597 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §650–A (Cum. Supp. 2014) 2012 Md. Laws p. 92013 Minn Laws p. 4042009 N. H. Laws p. 602011 N. Y Laws p. 7492013 R. I. Laws p. 72009 Vt. Acts & Resolves p. 332012 Wash. Sess. Laws p. 199

Judicial Decisions

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn.

135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008) Varnum v. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009) Griego v. Oliver, 2014–NMSC–003, ___ N. M. ___, 316

P. 3d 865 (2013)

Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N. J. 314, 79 A. 3d 1036 (2013) _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness. They contend that same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love and commitment through marriage, just like opposite-sexcouples. That position has undeniable appeal; over the 2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

past six years, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have revised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the same sex.

But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us.Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise “neither force nor will but merely judgment.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (capitaliza­tion altered).

Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal argu­ments for requiring such an extension are not. The fun­damental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sexcouples, or to retain the historic definition.

Today, however, the Court takes the extraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognize same-sexmarriage. Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I begrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the majority’s ap­proach is deeply disheartening. Supporters of same-sexmarriage have achieved considerable success persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex mar­riage, making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept. 3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judg­ment. The right it announces has no basis in the Consti­tution or this Court’s precedent. The majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own “new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” Ante, at 11, 23. As a result, the Court invali­dates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?

It can be tempting for judges to confuse our own prefer­ences with the requirements of the law. But as this Court has been reminded throughout our history, the Constitu­tion “is made for people of fundamentally differing views.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.” Id., at 69 (Harlan, J.,dissenting). The majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role. It seizes for itself a ques­tion the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that ques­tion. And it answers that question based not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own “under­standing of what freedom is and must become.” Ante, at

19. I have no choice but to dissent.

Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of mar­riage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt about the answer. 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting I
Petitioners and their amici base their arguments on the“right to marry” and the imperative of “marriage equality.”There is no serious dispute that, under our precedents, the Constitution protects a right to marry and requires Statesto apply their marriage laws equally. The real question in these cases is what constitutes “marriage,” or—more precisely—who decides what constitutes “marriage”?

The majority largely ignores these questions, relegating ages of human experience with marriage to a paragraph or two. Even if history and precedent are not “the end” of these cases, ante, at 4, I would not “sweep away what hasso long been settled” without showing greater respect for all that preceded us. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572

U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8).

A As the majority acknowledges, marriage “has existed for millennia and across civilizations.” Ante, at 3. For all those millennia, across all those civilizations, “marriage”referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a woman. See ante, at 4; Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1,

p. 12 (petitioners conceding that they are not aware of any society that permitted same-sex marriage before 2001). As the Court explained two Terms ago, “until recent years,. . . marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13).

This universal definition of marriage as the union of aman and a woman is no historical coincidence. Marriage did not come about as a result of a political movement,discovery, disease, war, religious doctrine, or any other moving force of world history—and certainly not as a result of a prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbi­5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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ans. It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need:ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship. See G. Quale, A History of Marriage Systems 2 (1988); cf. M. Cicero, De Officiis 57

(W. Miller transl. 1913) (“For since the reproductive in­stinct is by nature’s gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common.”).

The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so fundamental that they rarely require articulation. The human race must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman.When sexual relations result in the conception of a child,that child’s prospects are generally better if the mother and father stay together rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.

Society has recognized that bond as marriage. And by bestowing a respected status and material benefits on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within marriage rather than without. As one prominent scholar put it, “Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for children, and the sex that makes children possible,does not solve.” J. Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem 41 (2002).

This singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history. The majority accepts that at “the time of the Nation’s founding [mar­riage] was understood to be a voluntary contract between 6 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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a man and a woman.” Ante, at 6. Early Americans drew heavily on legal scholars like William Blackstone, who regarded marriage between “husband and wife” as one of the “great relations in private life,” and philosophers like John Locke, who described marriage as “a voluntary com­pact between man and woman” centered on “its chief end,procreation” and the “nourishment and support” of chil­dren. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *410; J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government §§78–79, p. 39 (J. Gough ed. 1947). To those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family “was a given: its structure, its stability, roles, and values ac­cepted by all.” Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and Family, in The Meaning of Marriage 100, 102 (R. George & J. Elshtain eds. 2006).

The Constitution itself says nothing about marriage,and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife.” Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593–594 (1890)). There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way. The four States in these cases are typical. Their laws, before and after statehood, have treated marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 396–399 (CA6 2014). Even when state laws did not specify this definition expressly, no one doubted what they meant. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. 1973). The meaning of “marriage” went without saying.

Of course, many did say it. In his first American dic­tionary, Noah Webster defined marriage as “the legal union of a man and woman for life,” which served the purposes of “preventing the promiscuous intercourse of thesexes, . . . promoting domestic felicity, and . . . securing the 7 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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maintenance and education of children.” 1 An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). An influential 19th-century treatise defined marriage as “a civil status, existing in one man and one woman legally united for life for those civil and social purposes which are based in the distinction of sex.” J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 25 (1852). The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defined marriage as “the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life.” Black’s Law Dictionary 756 (1891) (emphasis deleted). The dictionary maintained essentially that same definition for the next century.

This Court’s precedents have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent only with its tradi­tional meaning. Early cases on the subject referred to marriage as “the union for life of one man and one wom­an,” Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 45 (1885), which forms “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888). We later described marriage as “fundamental to our very existence and survival,” an understanding that necessarily implies a procreative component. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316

U. S. 535, 541 (1942). More recent cases have directly connected the right to marry with the “right to procreate.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386 (1978).

As the majority notes, some aspects of marriage have changed over time. Arranged marriages have largely given way to pairings based on romantic love. States have replaced coverture, the doctrine by which a married man and woman became a single legal entity, with laws that respect each participant’s separate status. Racial re­strictions on marriage, which “arose as an incident to slavery” to promote “White Supremacy,” were repealed by many States and ultimately struck down by this Court. 8 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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Loving, 388 U. S., at 6–7.

The majority observes that these developments “were not mere superficial changes” in marriage, but rather“worked deep transformations in its structure.” Ante, at 6–7. They did not, however, work any transformation in the core structure of marriage as the union between a man and a woman. If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was defined, no one would ever have said, “Mar­riage is the union of a man and a woman, where the woman is subject to coverture.” The majority may be right that the “history of marriage is one of both continuity and change,” but the core meaning of marriage has endured. Ante, at 6.

B Shortly after this Court struck down racial restrictions on marriage in Loving, a gay couple in Minnesota sought a marriage license. They argued that the Constitution required States to allow marriage between people of the same sex for the same reasons that it requires States to allow marriage between people of different races. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their analogy to Lov­ing, and this Court summarily dismissed an appeal. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972).In the decades after Baker, greater numbers of gays and lesbians began living openly, and many expressed a desire to have their relationships recognized as marriages. Over time, more people came to see marriage in a way that could be extended to such couples. Until recently, this new view of marriage remained a minority position. After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 inter­preted its State Constitution to require recognition of same-sex marriage, many States—including the four at issue here—enacted constitutional amendments formally adopting the longstanding definition of marriage. Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has 9 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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shifted rapidly. In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia became the first in the Nation to enact laws that revised the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, while also providing accommodations for religious believers. In 2011, the New York Legislature enacted a similar law. In 2012, voters in Maine did the same, reversing the result of a referendum just three years earlier in which they had upheld the traditional definition of marriage.

In all, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have changed their definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples. The highest courts of five States have decreed that same result under their own Constitutions. The remainder of the States retain the traditional definition of marriage.

Petitioners brought lawsuits contending that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment compel their States to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples. In a carefully rea­soned decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the democratic “momentum” in favor of “expand[ing] the definition of marriage to include gay couples,” but con­cluded that petitioners had not made “the case for consti­tutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.” 772 F. 3d, at 396, 403. That decision interpreted the Constitution correctly, and I would affirm.

II Petitioners first contend that the marriage laws of their States violate the Due Process Clause. The Solicitor Gen­eral of the United States, appearing in support of petition­ers, expressly disowned that position before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 38–39. The majority nevertheless resolves these cases for petitioners based 10 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.

The majority purports to identify four “principles and traditions” in this Court’s due process precedents that support a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry. Ante, at 12. In reality, however, the majority’s ap­proach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that char­acterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. Stripped of its shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society. If I were a legislator, I would certainly consider that view as a matter of social policy. But as a judge, I find the majority’s posi­tion indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.

A Petitioners’ “fundamental right” claim falls into the most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication. Petitioners do not contend that their States’ marriage laws violate an enumerated constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. There is, after all, no “Companionship and Understand­ing” or “Nobility and Dignity” Clause in the Constitution. See ante, at 3, 14. They argue instead that the laws vio­late a right implied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that “liberty” may not be deprived without “due process of law.”This Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to include a “substantive” component that protects certain liberty interests against state deprivation “no matter what process is provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993). The theory is that some liberties are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and therefore cannot be deprived with­out compelling justification. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 11 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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U. S. 97, 105 (1934).

Allowing unelected federal judges to select which un­enumerated rights rank as “fundamental”—and to strike down state laws on the basis of that determination—raises obvious concerns about the judicial role. Our precedent shave accordingly insisted that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifying implied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Kennedy,Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Re­straint 13 (1986) (Address at Stanford) (“One can conclude that certain essential, or fundamental, rights should exist in any just society. It does not follow that each of those essential rights is one that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution. The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.”).

The need for restraint in administering the strong medi­cine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way. The Court first applied substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sand-ford, 19 How. 393 (1857). There the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the ground that legislation re­stricting the institution of slavery violated the implied rights of slaveholders. The Court relied on its own concep­tion of liberty and property in doing so. It asserted that “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the UnitedStates of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.” Id., at 450. In a dissent that has outlasted the majority opinion, Justice Curtis ex­plained that when the “fixed rules which govern the inter­pretation of laws [are] abandoned, and the theoretical 12 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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opinions of individuals are allowed to control” the Consti­tution’s meaning, “we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is,according to their own views of what it ought to mean.” Id., at 621.

Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after Appomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause reappeared. In a series of early 20th-century cases, most prominently Lochner v. New York, this Court invalidated state statutes that presented “meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual,” and “undue interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract.” 198 U. S., at 60, 61. In Lochner itself, the Court struck down a New York law setting maximum hours for bakery employees, because there was “in our judgment, no reasonable foun­dation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law.” Id., at 58.

The dissenting Justices in Lochner explained that the New York law could be viewed as a reasonable response to legislative concern about the health of bakery employees,an issue on which there was at least “room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion.” Id., at 72 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The majority’s contrary conclusion required adopting as constitutional law “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.” Id., at 75 (opinion of Holmes, J.). As Justice Holmes memorably put it, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Her­bert Spencer’s Social Statics,” a leading work on the phi­losophy of Social Darwinism. Ibid. The Constitution “is not intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embody­ 13 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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ing them conflict with the Constitution.” Id., at 75–76.

In the decades after Lochner, the Court struck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty, often over strong dissents contending that “[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to before the public good.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of

D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 570 (1923) (opinion of Holmes, J.). By empowering judges to elevate their own policy judgments to the status of constitutionally protected “liberty,” the Lochner line of cases left “no alternative to regarding the court as a . . . legislative chamber.” L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 42 (1958).

Eventually, the Court recognized its error and vowed not to repeat it. “The doctrine that . . . due process author­izes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely,” we later explained,“has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judg­ment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963); see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952) (“we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation”). Thus, it has become an accepted rule that the Court will not hold laws unconstitutional simply be­cause we find them “unwise, improvident, or out of har­mony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955).

Rejecting Lochner does not require disavowing the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and this Court has not done so. But to avoid repeating Lochner’s error of converting personal preferences into constitutional man­dates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressed the need for “judicial self-restraint.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). Our precedents have required that implied fundamental rights be “objec­ 14 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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tively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi­tion,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 720–721 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the Court articulated the importance of history and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry most precisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before and after have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557

U. S. 52, 72 (2009); Flores, 507 U. S., at 303; United States

v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751 (1987); Moore v. East Cleve­land, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary, includ­ing this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu­tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the lan­guage or even the design of the Constitution.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57, 96–101 (2000) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (consulting “‘[o]ur Nation’s history, legal tradi­tions, and practices’” and concluding that “[w]e owe it to the Nation’s domestic relations legal structure . . . to proceed with caution” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721)).

Proper reliance on history and tradition of course re­quires looking beyond the individual law being challenged, so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its own constitutional justification. The Court is right about that. Ante, at 18. But given the few “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” Collins, 503

U. S., at 125, “an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on [an] abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U. S., at 504,

n. 12 (plurality opinion). Expanding a right suddenly and dramatically is likely to require tearing it up from its roots. Even a sincere profession of “discipline” in identify­ 15 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

ing fundamental rights, ante, at 10–11, does not provide a meaningful constraint on a judge, for “what he is really likely to be ‘discovering,’ whether or not he is fully aware of it, are his own values,” J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 44 (1980). The only way to ensure restraint in this deli­cate enterprise is “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles [of] the doctrines of federalism and separa­tion of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).

B The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal back­ground, and it is easy to see why: Its aggressive applica­tion of substantive due process breaks sharply with dec­ades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.

1 The majority’s driving themes are that marriage is desirable and petitioners desire it. The opinion describes the “transcendent importance” of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek to “demean,” “devalue,”“denigrate,” or “disrespect” the institution. Ante, at 3, 4, 6,

28. Nobody disputes those points. Indeed, the compelling personal accounts of petitioners and others like them are likely a primary reason why many Americans have changed their minds about whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. As a matter of constitutional law, however, the sincerity of petitioners’ wishes is not relevant.

When the majority turns to the law, it relies primarily on precedents discussing the fundamental “right to marry.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 383; see Loving, 388 U. S., at 12. These cases 16 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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do not hold, of course, that anyone who wants to get mar­ried has a constitutional right to do so. They instead require a State to justify barriers to marriage as that institution has always been understood. In Loving, the Court held that racial restrictions on the right to marry lacked a compelling justification. In Zablocki, restrictions based on child support debts did not suffice. In Turner, restrictions based on status as a prisoner were deemed impermissible.

None of the laws at issue in those cases purported to change the core definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The laws challenged in Zablocki and Turner did not define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman, where neither party owes child support or is in prison.” Nor did the interracial marriage ban at issue in Loving define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman of the same race.” See Tragen, Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Interracial Marriage, 32 Cal.

L. Rev. 269 (1944) (“at common law there was no ban on interracial marriage”); post, at 11–12, n. 5 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Removing racial barriers to marriage there­fore did not change what a marriage was any more than integrating schools changed what a school was. As the majority admits, the institution of “marriage” discussed in every one of these cases “presumed a relationship involv­ing opposite-sex partners.” Ante, at 11.

In short, the “right to marry” cases stand for the im­portant but limited proposition that particular restriction son access to marriage as traditionally defined violate due process. These precedents say nothing at all about a right to make a State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners actually seek here. See Windsor, 570

U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8) (“What Windsor and the United States seek . . . is not the protec­tion of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right.”). Neither petitioners nor the majority cites a 17 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional right. None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.

2 The majority suggests that “there are other, more in­structive precedents” informing the right to marry. Ante, at 12. Although not entirely clear, this reference seems tocorrespond to a line of cases discussing an implied funda­mental “right of privacy.” Griswold, 381 U. S., at 486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminal law that banned the use of contraceptives. Id., at 485–

486. The Court stressed the invasive nature of the ban, which threatened the intrusion of “the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” Id., at 485. In the Court’s view, such laws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the “right to be let alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453–454, n. 10 (1972) (internal quo­tation marks omitted); see Olmstead v. United States, 277

U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).The Court also invoked the right to privacy in Lawrence

v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003), which struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. Lawrence relied on the position that criminal sodomy laws, like bans on contraceptives, invaded privacy by inviting “unwar­ranted government intrusions” that “touc[h] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior . . . in the most private of places, the home.” Id., at 562, 567.

Neither Lawrence nor any other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert here. Unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives andsodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no gov­ernment intrusion. They create no crime and impose no punishment. Same-sex couples remain free to live together,to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit. No one is “condemned to live in lone l i­18 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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ness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one. Ante, at 28. At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with the “right to be let alone.”

The majority also relies on Justice Harlan’s influential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). As the majority recounts, that opinion states that “[d]ue process has not been reduced to any formula.” Id., at 542. But far from conferring the broad interpretive discretion that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes clear that courts implying fundamental rights are not“free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Ibid. They must instead have “regard to what history teaches” and exercise not only “judgment” but“restraint.” Ibid. Of particular relevance, Justice Harlan explained that “laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doc­trine in this area must build upon that basis.” Id., at 546.

In sum, the privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s position, because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding government benefits. Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the State. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 196 (1989); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35–37 (1973); post, at 9–13 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Thus, although the right to privacy recognized by our precedents certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to rede­fine marriage and no basis for striking down the laws at issue here. 19 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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3 Perhaps recognizing how little support it can derive from precedent, the majority goes out of its way to jettison the “careful” approach to implied fundamental rights taken by this Court in Glucksberg. Ante, at 18 (quoting 521 U. S., at 721). It is revealing that the majority’s posi­tion requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process. At least this part of the majority opinion has the virtue of candor. Nobody could rightly accuse the majority of taking a careful approach. Ultimately, only one precedent offers any support for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York, 198

U. S. 45. The majority opens its opinion by announcing petitioners’ right to “define and express their identity.” Ante, at 1–2. The majority later explains that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Ante, at 12. This free­wheeling notion of individual autonomy echoes nothing so much as “the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.” Lochner, 198 U. S., at 58 (emphasis added).

To be fair, the majority does not suggest that its indi­vidual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. The constraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own “reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new insight”into the “nature of injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear “as we learn [the] meaning” of liberty. Ante, at 10, 11. The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’sown conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” Ante, at 19. Whatever force that belief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences 20 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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adopted in Lochner. See 198 U. S., at 61 (“We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law,” which “is an illegal interference with the rights o findividuals . . . to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best”).

The majority recognizes that today’s cases do not mark “the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cau­tious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental rights.” Ante, at 25. On that much, we agree. The Court was “asked”—and it agreed—to “adopt a cautious ap­proach” to implying fundamental rights after the debacle of the Lochner era. Today, the majority casts caution aside and revives the grave errors of that period.

One immediate question invited by the majority’s posi­tion is whether States may retain the definition of mar­riage as a union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947

F. Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14­4117 (CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of mar­riage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradi­tion, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex mar­riage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.

It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and intheir autonomy to make such profound choices,” ante, at 13, why would there be any less dignity in the bond be­tween three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their 21 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” ante, at 15, why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children? If not having the oppor­tunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” ante, at 22, serve to disrespect and subor­dinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous rela­tionships? See Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 2009 (estimating 500,000polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married Lesbian “Throuple” Expecting First Child, N. Y. Post, Apr.23, 2014; Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L. J.1977 (2015).

I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There may well be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 6. But that is exactly the point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.

4 Near the end of its opinion, the majority offers perhaps the clearest insight into its decision. Expanding marriage to include same-sex couples, the majority insists, would “pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” Ante, at 27. This argument again echoes Lochner, which relied on its assessment that “we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.” 198 U. S., at 57. 22 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Then and now, this assertion of the “harm principle”sounds more in philosophy than law. The elevation of the fullest individual self-realization over the constraints that society has expressed in law may or may not be attractive moral philosophy. But a Justice’s commission does not confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of “due process.” There is indeed a process due the people on issues of this sort—the democratic process. Respecting that understanding re­quires the Court to be guided by law, not any particular school of social thought. As Judge Henry Friendly once put it, echoing Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. See Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion Opinion, 29 Harv. J. L. & Pub.Pol’y 1035, 1036–1037, 1058 (2006). And it certainly does not enact any one concept of marriage.

The majority’s understanding of due process lays out a tantalizing vision of the future for Members of this Court: If an unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can? But this approach is dangerous for the rule of law. The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down dem­ocratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs. The Court today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of the here and now. I agree with the majority that the “nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.” Ante, at 11. As petitioners put it, “times can blind.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 9, 10. But to blind yourself to history is both prideful and unwise. “The 23 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

past is never dead. It’s not even past.” W. Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1951).

III In addition to their due process argument, petitioners contend that the Equal Protection Clause requires their States to license and recognize same-sex marriages. The majority does not seriously engage with this claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow. The central point seems to be that there is a “synergy between” the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that some precedents relying on one Clause have also relied on the other. Ante, at 20. Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is case­book doctrine that the “modern Supreme Court’s treat­ment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judges ask whether the classifica­tion the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.” G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein,

M. Tushnet, & P. Karlan, Constitutional Law 453 (7th ed.

2013). The majority’s approach today is different: “Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each maybe instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and defini­tion of the right.” Ante, at 19.

The majority goes on to assert in conclusory fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for its holding. Ante, at 22. Yet the majority fails to pro­vide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal 24 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous viola­tion of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitu­tional questions. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009). In any event, the marriage laws at issue here do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ “legitimate state interest” in “preserving the traditional institution of marriage.” Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

It is important to note with precision which laws peti­tioners have challenged. Although they discuss some of the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such as hospital visitation rights and recognition of spousal status on official documents, petitioners’ lawsuits target the laws defining marriage generally rather than those allocating benefits specifically. The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were con­fronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. Of course, those more selective claims will not arise now that the Court has taken the drastic step of requiring every State to license and recog­nize marriages between same-sex couples.

IV The legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests “upon the respect accorded to its judgments.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 793 (2002) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). That respect flows from the perception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in decid­ing cases according to the Constitution and law. The role of the Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is anything but humble or restrained. Over and over, the majority exalts the role of the judiciary in delivering social change. In the majority’s telling, it is the courts, not the 25 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

people, who are responsible for making “new dimensions of freedom . . . apparent to new generations,” for providing“formal discourse” on social issues, and for ensuring “neu­tral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commen­tary.” Ante, at 7–9.

Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant conception of judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—and dismissal—of the public debate regarding same-sex marriage. Yes, the majority concedes, on one side are thousands of years of human history in every society known to have populated the planet. But on the other side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “many thought­ful District Court decisions,” “countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” and “more than 100” amicus briefs in these cases alone. Ante, at 9, 10, 23. What would be the point of allowing the democratic process to go on? It is high time for the Court to decide the meaning of marriage, based on five lawyers’ “better informed understanding” of “a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” Ante, at 19. The answer is surely there in one of those amicus briefs or studies.

Those who founded our country would not recognize the majority’s conception of the judicial role. They after all risked their lives and fortunes for the precious right to govern themselves. They would never have imagined yielding that right on a question of social policy to unac­countable and unelected judges. And they certainly would not have been satisfied by a system empowering judges to override policy judgments so long as they do so after “a quite extensive discussion.” Ante, at 8. In our democracy,debate about the content of the law is not an exhaustion requirement to be checked off before courts can impose their will. “Surely the Constitution does not put either the legislative branch or the executive branch in the position of a television quiz show contestant so that when a given period of time has elapsed and a problem remains unre­26 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

solved by them, the federal judiciary may press a buzzer and take its turn at fashioning a solution.” Rehnquist,The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693,700 (1976). As a plurality of this Court explained just lastyear, “It is demeaning to the democratic process to pre­sume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.” Schuette

v. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___, ___ –___ (2014) (slip op., at 16– 17).

The Court’s accumulation of power does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at the expense of the people. And they know it. Here and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage. They see voters carefully considering same-sex marriage, casting ballots in favor or opposed, and sometimes changing their minds. They see political lead­ers similarly reexamining their positions, and either re­versing course or explaining adherence to old conviction is confirmed anew. They see governments and businesses modifying policies and practices with respect to same-sex couples, and participating actively in the civic discourse. They see countries overseas democratically accepting profound social change, or declining to do so. This delib­erative process is making people take seriously questions that they may not have even regarded as questions before.

When decisions are reached through democratic means,some people will inevitably be disappointed with the re­sults. But those whose views do not prevail at least know that they have had their say, and accordingly are—in the tradition of our political culture—reconciled to the result of a fair and honest debate. In addition, they can gear upto raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on the winning side to think again. “That is exactly how oursystem of government is supposed to work.” Post, at 2–3 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).

But today the Court puts a stop to all that. By deciding 27 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

this question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide. As a thoughtful commentator observed about another issue, “The political process was moving . . . , not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.” Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. C. L. Rev. 375, 385–386 (1985) (footnote omitted). Indeed, however heartened the proponents of same-sex marriage might be on this day, it is worth ac­knowledging what they have lost, and lost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose this just when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.

Federal courts are blunt instruments when it comes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only to resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise from the exercise of a new right. Today’s decision,for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually spelled out in the Constitution. Amdt. 1.

Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include accommodations for 28 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing same-sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommo­dations. The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. Ante, at 27. The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion.Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.

Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example, a reli­gious college provides married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General candidly acknowl­edged that the tax exemptions of some religious institu­tions would be in question if they opposed same-sex mar­riage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers a cursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage. Ante, at 19. That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessary consequence” of laws codify­ing the traditional definition of marriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples. Ante, at 19. The major­ity reiterates such characterizations over and over. By the majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the understanding of marriage that has existed for our entire history—in particular, the tens of millions of people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring defini­ 29 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tion of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,”“disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “[d]ignitary wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors. Ante, at 17, 19, 22, 25. These apparent assaults on the character of fair minded people will have an effect, in society and in court. See post, at 6–7 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Moreover, they are entirely gratuitous. It is one thing for the major­ity to conclude that the Constitution protects a right to same-sex marriage; it is something else to portray every­one who does not share the majority’s “better informed understanding” as bigoted. Ante, at 19.

In the face of all this, a much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view is more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judges also reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the country and Court when Jus­tices have exceeded their proper bounds. And it is less pretentious than to suppose that while people around theworld have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousands of years, the present generation and the pre­sent Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that history and tradition.

* * * If you are among the many Americans—of whateversexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex mar­riage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the oppor­tunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.I respectfully dissent. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,dissenting.
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion in full. I write sepa­rately to call attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy.

The substance of today’s decree is not of immense per­sonal importance to me. The law can recognize as mar­riage whatever sexual attachments and living arrange­ments it wishes, and can accord them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of inheritance. 2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Those civil consequences—and the public approval that conferring the name of marriage evidences—can perhaps have adverse social effects, but no more adverse than the effects of many other controversial laws. So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about mar­riage. It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Consti­tution and its Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected commit­tee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extrav­agant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most im­portant liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

I Until the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed American democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citi­zens to accept their views. Americans considered the arguments and put the question to a vote. The electorates of 11 States, either directly or through their representa­tives, chose to expand the traditional definition of mar­riage. Many more decided not to.1 Win or lose, advocates for both sides continued pressing their cases, secure in the knowledge that an electoral loss can be negated by a later electoral win. That is exactly how our system of govern­

—————— 1 Brief for Respondents in No. 14–571, p. 14. 3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

SCALIA, J., dissenting

ment is supposed to work.2

The Constitution places some constraints on self-rule—constraints adopted by the People themselves when they ratified the Constitution and its Amendments. Forbidden are laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts,”3 denying “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of other States,4 prohibiting the free exercise of religion,5 abridging the freedom of speech,6 infringing the right to keep and bear arms,7 authorizing unreasonable searches and sei­zures,8 and so forth. Aside from these limitations, those powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to thepeople”9 can be exercised as the States or the People de­sire. These cases ask us to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains a limitation that requires the States to license and recognize marriages between two people of the same sex. Does it remove that issue from the political process?

Of course not. It would be surprising to find a prescrip­tion regarding marriage in the Federal Constitution since, as the author of today’s opinion reminded us only two years ago (in an opinion joined by the same Justices who join him today):
“[R]egulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”10

—————— 2Accord, Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 15–17). 3U. S. Const., Art. I, §10. 4Art. IV, §1. 5Amdt. 1. 6 Ibid. 7Amdt. 2. 8Amdt. 4. 9Amdt. 10. 10 United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 16)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES
SCALIA, J., dissenting

“[T]he Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”11

But we need not speculate. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases. When it comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as “due process of law” or “equal protection of the laws”—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did not under­stand it to prohibit a practice that remained both univer­sal and uncontroversial in the years after ratification.12 We have no basis for striking down a practice that is not expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, and that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to the Amendment’s ratification. Since there is no doubt what­ever that the People never decided to prohibit the limita­tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples, the public debate over same-sex marriage must be allowed to continue.

But the Court ends this debate, in an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law. Buried beneath the mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages of the opinion is a candid and startling assertion: No matter what it was the People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights that the Judiciary, in its “reasoned judgment,”thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect.13 That is so because “[t]he generations that wrote and rati­fied the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its

—————— 11 Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). 12See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 7–8). 13 Ante, at 10. 5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
SCALIA, J., dissenting

dimensions . . . . ”14 One would think that sentence would continue: “. . . and therefore they provided for a means by which the People could amend the Constitution,” or per­haps “. . . and therefore they left the creation of additional liberties, such as the freedom to marry someone of the same sex, to the People, through the never-ending process of legislation.” But no. What logically follows, in the majority’s judge-empowering estimation, is: “and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its mean­ing.”15 The “we,” needless to say, is the nine of us. “History and tradition guide and discipline [our] inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”16 Thus, rather than focusing on the People’s understanding of “liberty”—at the time of ratification or even today—the majority focuses on four“principles and traditions” that, in the majority’s view, prohibit States from defining marriage as an institution consisting of one man and one woman.17

This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. Except as limited by a constitutional prohibition agreed to by the People, the States are free to adopt whatever laws they like, even those that offend the esteemed Justices’ “reasoned judg­ment.” A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.

Judges are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers;whether they reflect the policy views of a particular con­stituency is not (or should not be) relevant. Not surpris­ingly then, the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section

—————— 14 Ante, at 11. 15 Ibid. 16 Ante, at 10–11. 17 Ante, at 12–18. 6 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

SCALIA, J., dissenting

of America. Take, for example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful law­yers 18 who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States. Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single South-westerner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner(California does not count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of Americans 19), or even a Protestant of any denomination. The strikingly unrepresentative character of the body voting on today’s social upheaval would be irrelevant if they were functioning as judges, answering the legal question whether the American people had ever ratified a constitutional provision that was understood to proscribe the traditional definition of marriage. But of course the Justices in today’s majority are not voting on that basis; they say they are not. And to allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.

II But what really astounds is the hubris reflected in today’s judicial Putsch. The five Justices who compose today’s majority are entirely comfortable concluding that

—————— 18The predominant attitude of tall-building lawyers with respect to the questions presented in these cases is suggested by the fact that the American Bar Association deemed it in accord with the wishes of its members to file a brief in support of the petitioners. See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 14–571 and 14– 574, pp. 1–5.19See Pew Research Center, America’s Changing Religious Land­scape 4 (May 12, 2015). 7 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
SCALIA, J., dissenting

every State violated the Constitution for all of the 135 years between the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and Massachusetts’ permitting of same-sex marriages in 2003.20 They have discovered in the Fourteenth Amend­ment a “fundamental right” overlooked by every person alive at the time of ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since. They see what lesser legal minds—minds like Thomas Cooley, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, William Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Henry Friendly—could not. They are certain that the People ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to bestow on them the power to remove questions from the democratic process when that is called for by their “reasoned judgment.” These Justices know that limiting marriage to one man and one woman is contrary to reason; they know that an institution as old as government itself, and accepted by every nation in history until 15 years ago,21 cannot possibly be supported by anything other than ignorance or bigotry. And they are willing to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres to what was, until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and all societies,stands against the Constitution.

The opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate con­curring or dissenting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so.22 Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often
—————— 20 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003). 21 Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 7). 22If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opin­ion for the Court that began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that 8 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

SCALIA, J., dissenting

profoundly incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that,through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spiritu­ality.”23 (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. Expression, sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently say.) Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”24 (Huh? How can a better informed under­standing of how constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define [whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a right?) And we are told that, “[i]n any particular case,” either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause “may be thought to capture the es­sence of [a] right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,” than the other, “even as the two Clauses may con­verge in the identification and definition of the right.”25 (What say? What possible “essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an “accurate and comprehensive way”? It stands for nothing whatever, except those free­doms and entitlements that this Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as employed today, identifies nothing except a difference in treatment that this Court

—————— allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity,” I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie. 23 Ante, at 13. 24 Ante, at 19. 25 Ibid. 9 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) SCALIA, J., dissenting

really dislikes. Hardly a distillation of essence. If the opinion is correct that the two clauses “converge in the identification and definition of [a] right,” that is only because the majority’s likes and dislikes are predictably compatible.) I could go on. The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff con­tained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.

* * * Hubris is sometimes defined as o’er weening pride; and pride, we know, goeth before a fall. The Judiciary is the“least dangerous” of the federal branches because it has“neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm” and the States, “even for the efficacy of its judgments.”26 With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabash­edly based not on law, but on the “reasoned judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence.

—————— 26The Federalist No. 78, pp. 522, 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamil­ton). _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,dissenting.
The Court’s decision today is at odds not only with the Constitution, but with the principles upon which our Nation was built. Since well before 1787, liberty has been understood as freedom from government action, not enti­tlement to government benefits. The Framers created our 2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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Constitution to preserve that understanding of liberty.Yet the majority invokes our Constitution in the name of a“liberty” that the Framers would not have recognized, to the detriment of the liberty they sought to protect. Alongthe way, it rejects the idea—captured in our Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is innate and suggests instead that it comes from the Government. This distor­tion of our Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts the relationship between the individual and the state in our Republic. I cannot agree with it.

I The majority’s decision today will require States to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages entered in other States largely based on a constitutional provision guaranteeing “due process”before a person is deprived of his “life, liberty, or prop­erty.” I have elsewhere explained the dangerous fiction of treating the Due Process Clause as a font of substantive rights. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811–812 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It distorts the constitutional text, which guar­antees only whatever “process” is “due” before a person is deprived of life, liberty, and property. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. Worse, it invites judges to do exactly what the majority has done here—“‘roa[m] at large in the constitu­tional field’ guided only by their personal views” as to the “‘fundamental rights’” protected by that document. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505

U. S. 833, 953, 965 (1992) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gris­wold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J.,concurring in judgment)).

By straying from the text of the Constitution, substan­tive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority. Petitioners argue 3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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that by enshrining the traditional definition of marriage in their State Constitutions through voter-approved amend­ments, the States have put the issue “beyond the reach of the normal democratic process.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 14–562, p. 54. But the result petitioners seek is far less democratic. They ask nine judges on this Court to enshrine their definition of marriage in the Federal Con­stitution and thus put it beyond the reach of the normal democratic process for the entire Nation. That a “bare majority” of this Court, ante, at 25, is able to grant this wish, wiping out with a stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over 30 States, based on a provi­sion that guarantees only “due process” is but further evidence of the danger of substantive due process.1

II Even if the doctrine of substantive due process were somehow defensible—it is not—petitioners still would not have a claim. To invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause at all—whether under a theory of “substantive” or“procedural” due process—a party must first identify a deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” The majority claims these state laws deprive petitioners of “liberty,” but the concept of “liberty” it conjures up bears no resem­blance to any plausible meaning of that word as it is used in the Due Process Clauses.

—————— 1The majority states that the right it believes is “part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.” Ante, at
19. Despite the “synergy” it finds “between th[ese] two protections,” ante, at 20, the majority clearly uses equal protection only to shore up its substantive due process analysis, an analysis both based on an imaginary constitutional protection and revisionist view of our history and tradition. 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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A 1
As used in the Due Process Clauses, “liberty” most likely refers to “the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,unless by due course of law.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commen­taries on the Laws of England 130 (1769) (Blackstone).That definition is drawn from the historical roots of the Clauses and is consistent with our Constitution’s text and structure.

Both of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses reach back to Magna Carta. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96

U. S. 97, 101–102 (1878). Chapter 39 of the original Magna Carta provided, “No free man shall be taken, im­prisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.” Magna Carta, ch. 39, in A. Howard, Magna Carta: Text and Commentary 43 (1964). Although the 1215 version of Magna Carta was in effect for only a few weeks, this provision was later reissued in 1225 with modest changes to its wording as follows: “No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his free­hold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or ex­iled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (1797). In his influential commentary on the provision many years later, Sir Edward Coke interpreted the words “by the law of the land” to mean the same thing as “by due process of the common law.” Id., at 50.

After Magna Carta became subject to renewed interest in the 17th century, see, e.g., ibid., William Blackstone referred to this provision as protecting the “absolute rights 5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) THOMAS, J., dissenting

of every Englishman.” 1 Blackstone 123. And he formu­lated those absolute rights as “the right of personal secu­rity,” which included the right to life; “the right of personal liberty”; and “the right of private property.” Id., at 125. He defined “the right of personal liberty” as “the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.” Id., at 125, 130.2

The Framers drew heavily upon Blackstone’s formula­tion, adopting provisions in early State Constitutions that replicated Magna Carta’s language, but were modified to refer specifically to “life, liberty, or property.”3 State ——————
2 The seeds of this articulation can also be found in Henry Care’s influential treatise, English Liberties. First published in America in 1721, it described the “three things, which the Law of England . . . principally regards and taketh Care of,” as “Life, Liberty and Estate,” and described habeas corpus as the means by which one could procure one’s “Liberty” from imprisonment. The Habeas Corpus Act, comment., in English Liberties, or the Free-born Subject’s Inheritance 185 (H. Care comp. 5th ed. 1721). Though he used the word “Liberties” by itself more broadly, see, e.g., id., at 7, 34, 56, 58, 60, he used “Liberty” in a narrow sense when placed alongside the words “Life” or “Estate,” see, e.g., id., at 185, 200.

3 Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina adopted the phrase“life, liberty, or property” in provisions otherwise tracking Magna Carta: “That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.” Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI (1776), in 3 Federal and State Constitu­tions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 1688 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909); see also S. C. Const., Art. XLI (1778), in 6 id., at 3257; N. C. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XII (1776), in 5 id., at 2788. Massa­chusetts and New Hampshire did the same, albeit with some altera­tions to Magna Carta’s framework: “[N]o subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” Mass. Const., pt. I, Art. XII (1780), in 3 id., at 1891; see also 6 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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decisions interpreting these provisions between the found­ing and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment almost uniformly construed the word “liberty” to refer only to freedom from physical restraint. See Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv.

L. Rev. 431, 441–445 (1926). Even one case that has been identified as a possible exception to that view merely used broad language about liberty in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding—a proceeding classically associated with obtaining freedom from physical restraint. Cf. id., at 444–445.

In enacting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Framers similarly chose to employ the “life, liberty, or property” formulation, though they otherwise deviated substantially from the States’ use of Magna Carta’s lan­guage in the Clause. See Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty” in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property,” 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 382 (1890). When read in light of the history of that formulation, it is hard to see how the “liberty” protected by the Clause could be inter­preted to include anything broader than freedom from physical restraint. That was the consistent usage of the time when “liberty” was paired with “life” and “property.”See id., at 375. And that usage avoids rendering superflu­ous those protections for “life” and “property.”

If the Fifth Amendment uses “liberty” in this narrow sense, then the Fourteenth Amendment likely does as well. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 534–535 (1884). Indeed, this Court has previously commented,“The conclusion is . . . irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the Fourteenth Amendment [as was used in the Fifth Amendment], it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent.” Ibid. And this

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N. H. Const., pt. I, Art. XV (1784), in 4 id., at 2455. 7 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) THOMAS, J., dissenting

Court’s earliest Fourteenth Amendment decisions appear to interpret the Clause as using “liberty” to mean freedom from physical restraint. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877), for example, the Court recognized the relationship between the two Due Process Clauses and Magna Carta, see id., at 123–124, and implicitly rejected the dissent’s argument that “‘liberty’” encompassed “something more . . . than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison,” id., at 142 (Field, J., dissenting). That the Court appears to have lost its way in more recenty ears does not justify deviating from the original meaning of the Clauses.

2 Even assuming that the “liberty” in those Clauses en­compasses something more than freedom from physical restraint, it would not include the types of rights claimed by the majority. In the American legal tradition, liberty has long been understood as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a particular gov­ernmental entitlement. The founding-era understanding of liberty was heavily influenced by John Locke, whose writings “on natural rights and on the social and governmental contract” were cited “[i]n pamphlet after pamphlet” by American writers.

B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolu­tion 27 (1967). Locke described men as existing in a state of nature, possessed of the “perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Govern­ment, §4, p. 4 (J. Gough ed. 1947) (Locke). Because that state of nature left men insecure in their persons and property, they entered civil society, trading a portion of their natural liberty for an increase in their security. See 8 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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id., §97, at 49. Upon consenting to that order, men ob­tained civil liberty, or the freedom “to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it.” Id., §22, at 13.4

This philosophy permeated the 18th-century political scene in America. A 1756 editorial in the Boston Gazette, for example, declared that “Liberty in the State of Nature” was the “inherent natural Right” “of each Man” “to make a free Use of his Reason and Understanding, and to chose that Action which he thinks he can give the best Account of,” but that, “in Society, every Man parts with a Small Share of his natural Liberty, or lodges it in the publick Stock, that he may possess the Remainder without Con­trol.” Boston Gazette and Country Journal, No. 58, May 10, 1756, p. 1. Similar sentiments were expressed in public speeches, sermons, and letters of the time. See 1 C.

—————— 4 Locke’s theories heavily influenced other prominent writers of the 17th and 18th centuries. Blackstone, for one, agreed that “natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature” and described civil liberty as that “which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct,” except as “restrained by human laws.” 1 Blackstone 121–122. And in a “treatise routinely cited by the Founders,” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, ante, at 5 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting inpart), Thomas Rutherforth wrote, “By liberty we mean the power,which a man has to act as he thinks fit, where no law restrains him; it may therefore be called a mans right over his own actions.” 1 T. Ruth­erforth, Institutes of Natural Law 146 (1754). Rutherforth explained that “[t]he only restraint, which a mans right over his own actions is originally under, is the obligation of governing himself by the law of nature, and the law of God,” and that “[w]hatever right those of our own species may have . . . to restrain [those actions] within certain bounds, beyond what the law of nature has prescribed, arises from some after-act of our own, from some consent either express or tacit, by which we have alienated our liberty, or transferred the right of direct­ing our actions from ourselves to them.” Id., at 147–148. 9 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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Hyneman & D. Lutz, American Political Writing During the Founding Era 1760–1805, pp. 100, 308, 385 (1983).

The founding-era idea of civil liberty as natural liberty constrained by human law necessarily involved only those freedoms that existed outside of government. See Ham­burger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 Yale L. J. 907, 918–919 (1993). As one later commentator observed, “[L]iberty in the eighteenth century was thought of much more in relation to ‘negative liberty’; that is, freedom from, not freedom to, freedom from a number of social and political evils, including arbi­trary government power.” J. Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution 56 (1988). Or as one scholar put it in 1776, “[T]he common idea of liberty is merely negative, and is only the absence of restraint.” R. Hey, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government §13, p. 8 (1776) (Hey). When the colonists described laws that would infringe their liberties, they discussed laws that would prohibit individuals “from walking in the streets and highways on certain saints days, or from being abroad after a certain time in the evening, or . . . restrain [them] from working up and man­ufacturing materials of [their] own growth.” Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty, in 1 Hyneman, supra, at 101. Each of those examples involved freedoms that existed outside of government.

B Whether we define “liberty” as locomotion or freedom from governmental action more broadly, petitioners have in no way been deprived of it.Petitioners cannot claim, under the most plausible definition of “liberty,” that they have been imprisoned or physically restrained by the States for participating in same-sex relationships. To the contrary, they have been able to cohabitate and raise their children in peace. They 10 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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have been able to hold civil marriage ceremonies in States that recognize same-sex marriages and private religious ceremonies in all States. They have been able to travel freely around the country, making their homes where they please. Far from being incarcerated or physically re­strained, petitioners have been left alone to order their lives as they see fit.

Nor, under the broader definition, can they claim that the States have restricted their ability to go about their daily lives as they would be able to absent governmental restrictions. Petitioners do not ask this Court to order the States to stop restricting their ability to enter same-sex relationships, to engage in intimate behavior, to make vows to their partners in public ceremonies, to engage in religious wedding ceremonies, to hold themselves out as married, or to raise children. The States have imposed no such restrictions. Nor have the States prevented petition­ers from approximating a number of incidents of marriage through private legal means, such as wills, trusts, and powers of attorney.

Instead, the States have refused to grant them govern­mental entitlements. Petitioners claim that as a matter of “liberty,” they are entitled to access privileges and benefits that exist solely because of the government. They want, for example, to receive the State’s imprimatur on their marriages—on state issued marriage licenses, death certif­icates, or other official forms. And they want to receive various monetary benefits, including reduced inheritance taxes upon the death of a spouse, compensation if a spouse dies as a result of a work-related injury, or loss of consor­tium damages in tort suits. But receiving governmental recognition and benefits has nothing to do with any un­derstanding of “liberty” that the Framers would have recognized.

To the extent that the Framers would have recognized a natural right to marriage that fell within the broader 11 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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definition of liberty, it would not have included a right to governmental recognition and benefits. Instead, it would have included a right to engage in the very same activities that petitioners have been left free to engage in—making vows, holding religious ceremonies celebrating those vows, raising children, and otherwise enjoying the society of one’s spouse—without governmental interference. At the founding, such conduct was understood to predate gov­ernment, not to flow from it. As Locke had explained many years earlier, “The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children.” Locke §77, at 39; see also J. Wilson, Lec­tures on Law, in 2 Collected Works of James Wilson 1068

(K. Hall and M. Hall eds. 2007) (concluding “that to the institution of marriage the true origin of society must be traced”). Petitioners misunderstand the institution of marriage when they say that it would “mean little” absent governmental recognition. Brief for Petitioners in No. 14– 556, p. 33.

Petitioners’ misconception of liberty carries over into their discussion of our precedents identifying a right to marry, not one of which has expanded the concept of “lib­erty” beyond the concept of negative liberty. Those prece­dents all involved absolute prohibitions on private actions associated with marriage. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), for example, involved a couple who was criminally prosecuted for marrying in the District of Columbia and cohabiting in Virginia, id., at 2–3.5 They were each sen­

—————— 5The suggestion of petitioners and their amici that antimiscegenation laws are akin to laws defining marriage as between one man and one woman is both offensive and inaccurate. “America’s earliest laws against interracial sex and marriage were spawned by slavery.” P. Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America 19 (2009). For instance, Maryland’s 1664 law prohibit­ing marriages between “ ‘freeborne English women’ ” and “ ‘Negro Sla[v]es’ ” was passed as part of the very act that authorized lifelong 12 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES
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Sentenced to a year of imprisonment, suspended for a term of 25 years on the condition that they not reenter the Com­monwealth together during that time. Id., at 3.6 In a similar vein, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), involved a man who was prohibited, on pain of criminal penalty, from “marry[ing] in Wisconsin or elsewhere”because of his outstanding child-support obligations, id., at 387; see id., at 377–378. And Turner v. Safley, 482

U. S. 78 (1987), involved state inmates who were prohib­ited from entering marriages without the permission of the superintendent of the prison, permission that could not be granted absent compelling reasons, id., at 82. In none of those cases were individuals denied solely governmental —————— slavery in the colony. Id., at 19–20. Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws

likewise were passed in a 1691 resolution entitled “An act for suppress­ing outlying Slaves.” Act of Apr. 1691, Ch. XVI, 3 Va. Stat. 86 (W. Hening ed. 1823) (reprint 1969) (italics deleted). “It was not until the Civil War threw the future of slavery into doubt that lawyers, legisla­tors, and judges began to develop the elaborate justifications that signified the emergence of miscegenation law and made restrictions on interracial marriage the foundation of post-Civil War white suprem­acy.” Pascoe, supra, at 27–28.

Laws defining marriage as between one man and one woman do not share this sordid history. The traditional definition of marriage has prevailed in every society that has recognized marriage throughout

history. Brief for Scholars of History and Related Disciplines as Amici Curiae 1. It arose not out of a desire to shore up an invidious institu­tion like slavery, but out of a desire “to increase the likelihood that children will be born and raised in stable and enduring family units byboth the mothers and the fathers who brought them into this world.” Id., at 8. And it has existed in civilizations containing all manner of views on homosexuality. See Brief for Ryan T. Anderson as Amicus Curiae 11–12 (explaining that several famous ancient Greeks wrote approvingly of the traditional definition of marriage, though same-sexsexual relations were common in Greece at the time).

6The prohibition extended so far as to forbid even religious ceremo­nies, thus raising a serious question under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, as at least one amicus brief at the time pointed out. Brief for John J. Russell et al. as Amici Curiae in Loving v. Virginia,

O.T. 1966, No. 395, pp. 12–16. 13 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

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recognition and benefits associated with marriage.

In a concession to petitioners’ misconception of liberty,the majority characterizes petitioners’ suit as a quest to “find . . . liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages between persons of the oppo­site sex.” Ante, at 2. But “liberty” is not lost, nor can it be found in the way petitioners seek. As a philosophical matter, liberty is only freedom from governmental action, not an entitlement to governmental benefits. And as a constitutional matter, it is likely even narrower than that,encompassing only freedom from physical restraint and imprisonment. The majority’s “better informed under­standing of how constitutional imperatives define . . .liberty,” ante, at 19,—better informed, we must assume, than that of the people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment—runs headlong into the reality that our Constitution is a “collection of ‘Thou shalt nots,’” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 9 (1957) (plurality opinion), not “Thou shalt provides.”

III The majority’s inversion of the original meaning of liberty will likely cause collateral damage to other aspects of our constitutional order that protect liberty.

A The majority apparently disregards the political process as a protection for liberty. Although men, in forming a civil society, “give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community,” Locke §99, at 49, they reserve the authority to exercise natural liberty within the bounds of laws estab­lished by that society, id., §22, at 13; see also Hey §§52, 54, at 30–32. To protect that liberty from arbitrary inter­ference, they establish a process by which that society can 14 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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adopt and enforce its laws. In our country, that process is primarily representative government at the state level, with the Federal Constitution serving as a backstop for that process. As a general matter, when the States act through their representative governments or by popular vote, the liberty of their residents is fully vindicated. This is no less true when some residents disagree with the result; indeed, it seems difficult to imagine any law on which all residents of a State would agree. See Locke §98,at 49 (suggesting that society would cease to function if it required unanimous consent to laws). What matters is that the process established by those who created the society has been honored.

That process has been honored here. The definition of marriage has been the subject of heated debate in the States. Legislatures have repeatedly taken up the matter on behalf of the People, and 35 States have put the ques­tion to the People themselves. In 32 of those 35 States, the People have opted to retain the traditional definition of marriage. Brief for Respondents in No. 14–571, pp. 1a– 7a. That petitioners disagree with the result of that pro­cess does not make it any less legitimate. Their civil liberty has been vindicated.

B Aside from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.The history of religious liberty in our country is familiar: Many of the earliest immigrants to America came seeking freedom to practice their religion without restraint. See McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1422–1425 (1990). When they arrived, they created their own havens for religious practice. Ibid. Many of these havens were initially homogenous communities with established 15 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) THOMAS, J., dissenting

religions. Ibid. By the 1780’s, however, “America was in the wake of a great religious revival” marked by a move toward free exercise of religion. Id., at 1437. Every State save Connecticut adopted protections for religious freedom in their State Constitutions by 1789, id., at 1455, and, of course, the First Amendment enshrined protection for the free exercise of religion in the U. S. Constitution. But that protection was far from the last word on religious liberty in this country, as the Federal Government and the States have reaffirmed their commitment to religious liberty by

codifying protections for religious practice. See, e.g., Reli­gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42

U. S. C. §2000bb et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. §52–571b (2015).

Numerous amici—even some not supporting the States—have cautioned the Court that its decision here will “have unavoidable and wide-ranging implications for religious liberty.” Brief for General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists et al. as Amici Curiae 5. In our society, marriage is not simply a governmental institution;it is a religious institution as well. Id., at 7. Today’s decision might change the former, but it cannot change the latter. It appears all but inevitable that the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples.

The majority appears unmoved by that inevitability. It makes only a weak gesture toward religious liberty in a single paragraph, ante, at 27. And even that gesture indicates a misunderstanding of religious liberty in our Nation’s tradition. Religious liberty is about more than just the protection for “religious organizations and persons . . . as they seek to teach the principles that are so ful­filling and so central to their lives and faiths.” Ibid. Religious liberty is about freedom of action in matters of religion generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly correlated to the civil restraints placed upon religious 16 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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practice.7

Although our Constitution provides some protection against such governmental restrictions on religious prac­tices, the People have long elected to afford broader pro­tections than this Court’s constitutional precedents man­date. Had the majority allowed the definition of marriage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution requires—the People could have considered the religious liberty implications of deviating from the traditional defi­nition as part of their deliberative process. Instead, the majority’s decision short-circuits that process, with poten­tially ruinous consequences for religious liberty.

IV Perhaps recognizing that these cases do not actually involve liberty as it has been understood, the majority goes to great lengths to assert that its decision will ad­vance the “dignity” of same-sex couples. Ante, at 3, 13, 26,

28.8 The flaw in that reasoning, of course, is that the Constitution contains no “dignity” Clause, and even if it did, the government would be incapable of bestowing dignity.

Human dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the Framers proclaimed in the Decla­ration of Independence that “all men are created equal”

—————— 7 Concerns about threats to religious liberty in this context are not unfounded. During the hey-day of antimiscegenation laws in this country, for instance, Virginia imposed criminal penalties on ministers who performed marriage in violation of those laws, though their reli­gions would have permitted them to perform such ceremonies. Va. Code Ann. §20–60 (1960). 8The majority also suggests that marriage confers “nobility” on indi­viduals. Ante, at 3. I am unsure what that means. People may choose to marry or not to marry. The decision to do so does not make one person more “noble” than another. And the suggestion that Americans who choose not to marry are inferior to those who decide to enter such relationships is specious. 17 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) THOMAS, J., dissenting
and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.

The corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by the government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved.Those held in internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined them. And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because the government denies them those benefits. The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.

The majority’s musings are thus deeply misguided, but at least those musings can have no effect on the dignity of the persons the majority demeans. Its mischaracteriza­tion of the arguments presented by the States and their amici can have no effect on the dignity of those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving the traditional definition of marriage can have no effect on the dignity of the people who voted for them. Its invalidation of those laws can have no effect on the dignity of the people who continue to adhere to the traditional definition of marriage. And its disdain for the understandings of liberty and dignity upon which this Nation was founded can have no effect on the dignity of Americans who continue to believe in them.

* * * Our Constitution—like the Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a simple truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to be shielded from—not provided by—the State. Today’s decision casts that truth aside. In its haste to reach a desired result, the majority misapplies a clause focused on “due process” to afford substantive rights, disregards the most plausible 18 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

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understanding of the “liberty” protected by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded. Its decision will have inestimable consequences for our Constitution and our society. I respectfully dissent. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
Until the federal courts intervened, the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their Statesshould recognize same-sex marriage.1 The question in ——————
1I use the phrase “recognize marriage” as shorthand for issuing mar­2 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ALITO, J., dissenting

these cases, however, is not what States should do about same-sex marriage but whether the Constitution answers that question for them. It does not. The Constitution leaves that question to be decided by the people of each State.

I The Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage, but the Court holds that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses this right. Our Nation was founded upon the principle that every person has the unalienable right to liberty, but liberty is a term of many meanings. For clas­sical liberals, it may include economic rights now limited by government regulation. For social democrats, it may include the right to a variety of government benefits. For today’s majority, it has a distinctively postmodern meaning.To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing theirpersonal vision of liberty upon the American people, the Court has held that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only those rights that are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi­tion.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 701, 720–721 (1997). And it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among those rights. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (ALITO, J., dissenting)(slip op., at 7). Indeed: “In this country, no State permitted same-sex mar­riage until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass.

—————— riage licenses and conferring those special benefits and obligations provided under state law for married persons. 3 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ALITO, J., dissenting

309, 798 N. E. 2d 941. Nor is the right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other na­tions. No country allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.

“What [those arguing in favor of a constitutional right to same sex marriage] seek, therefore, is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right, and they seek this innovation notfrom a legislative body elected by the people, but from unelected judges. Faced with such a request, judge shave cause for both caution and humility.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7–8) (footnote omitted).

For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is contrary to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer constitutional pro­tection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental.

II Attempting to circumvent the problem presented by the newness of the right found in these cases, the majority claims that the issue is the right to equal treatment.Noting that marriage is a fundamental right, the majority argues that a State has no valid reason for denying that right to same-sex couples. This reasoning is dependent upon a particular understanding of the purpose of civil marriage. Although the Court expresses the point in loftier terms, its argument is that the fundamental pur­pose of marriage is to promote the well-being of those who choose to marry. Marriage provides emotional fulfillment and the promise of support in times of need. And by bene­fiting persons who choose to wed, marriage indirectly benefits society because persons who live in stable, ful­filling, and supportive relationships make better citizens. It is for these reasons, the argument goes, that States 4 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ALITO, J., dissenting

encourage and formalize marriage, confer special benefits on married persons, and also impose some special obliga­tions. This understanding of the States’ reasons for recog­nizing marriage enables the majority to argue that same-sex marriage serves the States’ objectives in the same way as opposite-sex marriage.

This understanding of marriage, which focuses almost entirely on the happiness of persons who choose to marry,is shared by many people today, but it is not the traditional one. For millennia, marriage was inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do: procreate.

Adherents to different schools of philosophy use differ­ent terms to explain why society should formalize mar­riage and attach special benefits and obligations to per­sons who marry. Here, the States defending their adherence to the traditional understanding of marriage have explained their position using the pragmatic vocabu­lary that characterizes most American political discourse.Their basic argument is that States formalize and promote marriage, unlike other fulfilling human relationships, in order to encourage potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children. They thus argue that there are reasonable secular grounds for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.

If this traditional understanding of the purpose of mar­riage does not ring true to all ears today, that is probably because the tie between marriage and procreation has frayed. Today, for instance, more than 40% of all children in this country are born to unmarried women.2 This de­——————
2See, e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, D. Martin, B. Hamilton, M. Osterman, S. Curtin, & T. Matthews, Births: Final Data for 2013, 64 National Vital Statistics Reports, No. 1, p. 2(Jan. 15, 2015), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/ 5 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

ALITO, J., dissenting

velopment undoubtedly is both a cause and a result ofchanges in our society’s understanding of marriage.

While, for many, the attributes of marriage in 21st­ century America have changed, those States that do not want to recognize same-sex marriage have not yet given up on the traditional understanding. They worry that by officially abandoning the older understanding, they may contribute to marriage’s further decay. It is far beyond the outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not adhere to the understanding of marriage that has long prevailed, not just in this country and others with similar cultural roots, but also in a great variety of countries and cultures all around the globe.

As I wrote in Windsor:
“The family is an ancient and universal human in­stitution. Family structure reflects the characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular understanding of marriage and the family can have profound effects. Past changes in the understanding of marriage—for example, the gradual ascendance of the idea that romantic love is a prereq­uisite to marriage—have had far-reaching conse­quences. But the process by which such consequences come about is complex, involving the interaction of numerous factors, and tends to occur over an extended period of time.

“We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some

——————
nvsr64_01.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); cf. Dept. of Health and HumanServices, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), S. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Non-martial Childbearing in the United States, NCHS Data Brief, No. 18(May 2009), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databrief/db18.pdf. 6 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ALITO, J., dissenting

time to come. There are those who think that allow­ing same-sex marriage will seriously undermine the institution of marriage. Others think that recognition of same-sex marriage will fortify a now-shaky institution.

“At present, no one—including social scientists, phi­losophers, and historians—can predict with any cer­tainty what the long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage will be. And judges are certainly not equipped to make such an assess­ment. The Members of this Court have the authority and the responsibility to interpret and apply the Con­stitution. Thus, if the Constitution contained a provi­sion guaranteeing the right to marry a person of the same sex, it would be our duty to enforce that right.But the Constitution simply does not speak to the is­sue of same-sex marriage. In our system of govern­ment, ultimate sovereignty rests with the people, and the people have the right to control their own destiny. Any change on a question so fundamental should be made by the people through their elected officials.” 570 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 8–10)(citations and footnotes omitted).

III Today’s decision usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of marriage. The decision will also have other important consequences.It will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling toassent to the new orthodoxy. In the course of its opinion,the majority compares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied equal treatment for African-Americans and women. E.g., ante, at 11–13. The implications of this analogy will be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dissent. 7 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) ALITO, J., dissenting

Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reas­sure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. Ante, at 26–27. We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.

The system of federalism established by our Constitu­tion provides a way for people with different beliefs to live together in a single nation. If the issue of same-sex mar­riage had been left to the people of the States, it is likely that some States would recognize same-sex marriage and others would not. It is also possible that some States would tie recognition to protection for conscience rights.The majority today makes that impossible. By imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority facili­tates the marginalization of the many Americans who have traditional ideas. Recalling the harsh treatment of gays and lesbians in the past, some may think that turn- about is fair play. But if that sentiment prevails, the Nation will experience bitter and lasting wounds.

Today’s decision will also have a fundamental effect on this Court and its ability to uphold the rule of law. If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and im­pose that right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate. Even enthusiastic sup­porters of same-sex marriage should worry about the scope of the power that today’s majority claims.

Today’s decision shows that decades of attempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of its authority have failed. A lesson that some will take from today’s decision is that 8 OBERGEFELL v. HODGES ALITO, J., dissenting

preaching about the proper method of interpreting the Constitution or the virtues of judicial self-restraint and humility cannot compete with the temptation to achievewhat is viewed as a noble end by any practicable means. I do not doubt that my colleagues in the majority sincerely see in the Constitution a vision of liberty that happens to coincide with their own. But this sincerity is cause for concern, not comfort. What it evidences is the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption of our legal culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.

Most Americans—understandably—will cheer or lament today’s decision because of their views on the issue of same-sex marriage. But all Americans, whatever their thinking on that issue, should worry about what the ma­jority’s claim of power portends

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Sincerely,

David Dillard

Temple University

(215) 204 – 4584

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t: MARRIAGE: SAME SEX MARRIAGE : UNITED STATES: GOVERNMENT: COURTS: SUPREME COURT : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. [FULL TEXT]

HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: Statehouse Fights Over Obamacare To Rage On Despite Supreme Court Decision

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LAW: CASE: DECISIONS:

Statehouse Fights Over Obamacare To Rage On
Despite Supreme Court Decision

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.

Statehouse Fights Over Obamacare To Rage On
Despite Supreme Court Decision

June 25, 201512:20 PM ET

NPR

http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/06/25/417442153/statehouse-
fights-over-obamacare-to-rage-on-despite-supreme-court-decision

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A shorter URL for the above link:

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http://tinyurl.com/ox2klbg

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But the historic ruling in King v. Burwell may be far from the last word
on health overhaul.

.

Bills to advance or cripple the law in statehouses didn’t come to a halt
in the months that lawmakers awaited the Supreme Court decision. They may
well smolder for months or years.

.

“I think we should continue to do everything we can to opt out of
Obamacare,” said Mike Ritze, a Republican member of the Oklahoma House of
Representatives and staunch foe of the law.

.

The court’s decision in King v. Burwell was anxiously awaited by both
backers and supporters of the Affordable Care Act, who agreed that a
decision invalidating the subsidies would have created chaos for
Obamacare.

.

snip

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But in statehouses around the country, fighting over the act will likely
continue. The Center for Public Integrity reported on the heated war over
Obamacare in state legislatures earlier this year, finding more than 700
health overhaul-related bills introduced during 2014 or carried over from
2013 in states where legislatures allow that.

.

Five states California, Hawaii, Illinois, New York and Washington saw 50
or more health bills each, according to data from the National Conference
of State Legislatures.

.

The NCSL has tracked more than 170 new state bills filed in 2015 relating
to health issues, including some direct assaults on the Affordable Care
Act. A list is here.

.

Whether some diehard opponents will stand down amid greater public
acceptance of the law isn’t clear. One who says he won’t is Ritze, an
osteopathic physician who chairs the Oklahoma House Public Health
Committee.

.

“We’ll continue to introduce bills and legislation to take bites out of
the ACA,” said Ritze.

.

The National Academy for State Health Policy, an independent group, has
taken notice of bills to create exchanges or to junk them.

.

As of June, 11 states are considering bills to now establish their own
exchanges or designate the federal exchange as the state’s own. On the
flip side, lawmakers in 10 states introduced bills this year to block
creation of an exchange or to scrap one that’s in place, according to the
academy. Here’s a state-by-state list tracking the bills. How states might
link up to the federal site isn’t entirely clear at this point.

.

Not-so-hidden agendas

.

Some bills are the handiwork of political groups that push agendas on a
range of hot-button topics across the country.

.

The conservative American Legislative Exchange Council, works to “advance
limited government, free markets and federalism at the state level.” It
has long championed “model” bills that gum up enforcement of the health
reform law.

.

.

The complete article may be read at the URL above.

.

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Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 – 4584
jwne@temple.edu
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Obamacare Ruling: Six Takeaways for 2016

.

.

Obamacare Ruling: Six Takeaways for 2016

The real import of the high courts decision falls on the Republican side
of the presidential field.

By Glenn Thrush and Kyle Cheney

6/25/15 3:03 PM EDT

Updated 6/25/15 9:33 PM EDT

Politico

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/
obamacare-ruling-six-takeaways-gop-presidential-election-119432.html

.

A shorter URL for the above link:

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http://tinyurl.com/ox2klbg

.

.

Today was the rarest of days in American political history the legacies
of both a sitting president and a Supreme Court chief justice were defined
in an instant.

.

While the jockeying swarm of 2016 aspirants arent posing for posterity,
they are angling for power and the courts 6-to-3 decision upholding
Obamacare subsidies alters their calculations. Its nothing compared to the
unpinned hand grenade that would have been chucked into the field if the
Affordable Care Act had been toppled as many analysts (and Republicans)
conjectured, but its forcing a rethinking nevertheless.

.

President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton hailed the decision as an
unalloyed and historic victory, even if one cynical Democrat interviewed
by POLITICO thought a loss would have galvanized Clintons sleepy base like
nothing else could have.

.

The rulings real political import lies on the Republican side, which is
united in opposition to Obamacare but deeply divided on how to get rid of
it and even over the tone to use when saying nasty things about it.

.

The consensus: It was a constitutional abomination and an electoral
godsend. The repeal Obamacare idea was good politically, but in practice,
to peel back that whole program, was more complicated and less realistic,
said Jason Roe, a California-based Republican consultant. I dont think
there is any [Republican] who can point to something and say, this is the
consensus replacement, and that was part of our struggle. Whats next?
Republicans dont need to answer that now.

.

In general, Id say this was decent day for the Republican Party, said a
top staffer for a Republican 2016 candidate. Its cleared off the table And
we dont have to spend the next 18 months trying to create a replacement
for all the people who would lose coverage.

.

With the case off the table, here are six takeaways on the decision and
its impact on a very rattled 2016 GOP field:

.

snip

.

.

Topics Covered in This Article:

.

The pitchforks are coming for you, Jeb and Marco

Its Ted Cruzs moment not

Start calling it Hillarycare, please

Scott Walker is a happy man

Ca-ching

Benedict Roberts

.

.

The complete article may be read at the URL above.

.

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Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 – 4584
jwne@temple.edu
http://workface.com/e/daviddillard

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David P. Dillard
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HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: Obamacare Ruling: Six Takeaways for 2016

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES : Syllabus : KING ET AL. v. BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.

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HEALTH CARE REFORM :

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES :
Syllabus : KING ET AL. v. BURWELL,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.

.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES :
Syllabus : KING ET AL. v. BURWELL,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.


THE COMPLETE DOCUMENT WILL BE FOUND HERE:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-114_qol1.pdf

.

.


(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2014

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as 
isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is 
issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but 
has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 
337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KING ET AL. v. BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-114. Argued March 4, 2015-Decided June 25, 2015

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act grew out of a long history 
of failed health insurance reform. In the 1990s, several States sought to 
expand access to coverage by imposing a pair of insurance market 
regulations-a "guaranteed issue" requirement, which bars insurers from 
denying coverage to any person because of his health,and a "community 
rating" requirement, which bars insurers fromcharging a person higher 
premiums for the same reason. The reforms achieved the goal of expanding 
access to coverage, but they also encouraged people to wait until they got 
sick to buy insurance. The result was an economic "death spiral": premiums 
rose, the number of people buying insurance declined, and insurers left 
the market entirely. In 2006, however, Massachusetts discovered a way to 
makethe guaranteed issue and community rating requirements work-by 
requiring individuals to buy insurance and by providing tax credits to 
certain individuals to make insurance more affordable. The combination of 
these three reforms-insurance market regulations, a coverage mandate, and 
tax credits-enabled Massachusetts to drastically reduce its uninsured 
rate. The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key reforms 
that made the Massachusetts system successful. First, the Act adopts the 
guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. 42
U. S. C. 300gg, 300gg-1. Second, the Act generally requires individuals to 
maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment tothe IRS, unless the 
cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of that individual's 
income. 26 U. S. C. 5000A. And third, the Act seeks to make insurance more 
affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household 
incomes between 100 per2
KING v. BURWELL


Syllabus

cent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. 36B.
In addition to those three reforms, the Act requires the creation of an 
"Exchange" in each State-basically, a marketplace that allowspeople to 
compare and purchase insurance plans. The Act gives each State the 
opportunity to establish its own Exchange, but provides that the Federal 
Government will establish "such Exchange" if the State does not. 42 U. S. 
C. 18031, 18041. Relatedly, the Act provides that tax credits "shall be 
allowed" for any "applicable taxpayer,"26 U. S. C. 36B(a), but only if the 
taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through "an Exchange 
established by the State under [42
U. S. C. 18031]," 36B(b)-(c). An IRS regulation interprets thatlanguage as 
making tax credits available on "an Exchange," 26 CFR1.36B-2, "regardless 
of whether the Exchange is established andoperated by a State . . . or by 
HHS," 45 CFR 155.20.
Petitioners are four individuals who live in Virginia, which has aFederal 
Exchange. They do not wish to purchase health insurance. In their view, 
Virginia's Exchange does not qualify as "an Exchangeestablished by the 
State under [42 U. S.


C. 18031]," so they should not receive any tax credits. That would make 
the cost of buying insurance more than eight percent of petitioners' 
income, exemptingthem from the Act's coverage requirement. As a result of 
the IRS Rule, however, petitioners would receive tax credits. That would 
make the cost of buying insurance less than eight percent of their income, 
which would subject them to the Act's coverage requirement.
Petitioners challenged the IRS Rule in Federal District Court. The 
District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the Act unambiguously made 
tax credits available to individuals enrolled through a Federal Exchange. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.The Fourth Circuit 
viewed the Act as ambiguous, and deferred to theIRS's interpretation under 
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. 
S. 837.
Held: Section 36B's tax credits are available to individuals in States 
that have a Federal Exchange. Pp. 7-21.


(a) When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute, thisCourt 
often applies the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. 
But Chevron does not provide the appropriate framework here. The tax 
credits are one of the Act's key reforms andwhether they are available on 
Federal Exchanges is a question ofdeep "economic and political 
significance"; had Congress wished toassign that question to an agency, it 
surely would have done so expressly. And it is especially unlikely that 
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no 
expertise in craftinghealth insurance policy of this sort.
It is instead the Court's task to determine the correct reading of
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3


Syllabus


Section 36B. If the statutory language is plain, the Court must enforce it 
according to its terms. But oftentimes the meaning-or ambiguity-of certain 
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. So when 
deciding whether the language is plain,the Court must read the words "in 
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133. Pp. 
7-9.


(b)


When read in context, the phrase "an Exchange established bythe State 
under [42 U. S. C. 18031]" is properly viewed as ambiguous. The phrase may 
be limited in its reach to State Exchanges. But it could also refer to all 
Exchanges-both State and Federal-forpurposes of the tax credits. If a 
State chooses not to follow the directive in Section 18031 to establish an 
Exchange, the Act tells the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
establish "such Exchange." 18041. And by using the words "such Exchange," 
the Act indicates that State and Federal Exchanges should be the same. But 
State and Federal Exchanges would differ in a fundamental way iftax 
credits were available only on State Exchanges-one type of Exchange would 
help make insurance more affordable by providing billions of dollars to 
the States' citizens; the other type of Exchange would not. Several other 
provisions in the Act-e.g., Section 18031(i)(3)(B)'s requirement that all 
Exchanges create outreach programs to "distribute fair and impartial 
information concerning . . . the availability of premium tax credits under 
section 36B"-would make little sense if tax credits were not available on 
Federal Exchanges.
The argument that the phrase "established by the State" would 
besuperfluous if Congress meant to extend tax credits to both State 
andFederal Exchanges is unpersuasive. This Court's "preference for 
avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute." Lamie v. United States 
Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 536. And rigorous application of thatcanon does 
not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair constructionof the 
Affordable Care Act, which contains more than a few examples of inartful 
drafting. The Court nevertheless must do its best, "bearing in mind the 
'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.' " Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. 
S. ___, ___. Pp. 9-15.


(c)


Given that the text is ambiguous, the Court must look to the broader 
structure of the Act to determine whether one of Section 36B's 
"permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible 
with the rest of the law." United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371.
Here, the statutory scheme compels the Court to reject petitioners'
4 KING v. BURWELL


Syllabus interpretation because it would destabilize the individual 
insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create 
the very "death spirals" that Congress designed the Act to avoid. Under 
petitioners' reading, the Act would not work in a State with a Federal 
Exchange. As they see it, one of the Act's three major reforms-the tax 
credits-would not apply. And a second major reform-the coverage 
requirement-would not apply in a meaningful way, because somany 
individuals would be exempt from the requirement without the tax credits. 
If petitioners are right, therefore, only one of the Act's three major 
reforms would apply in States with a Federal Exchange.
The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement 
could well push a State's individual insurance market intoa death spiral. 
It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. 
Congress made the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements 
applicable in every State in the Nation, but those requirements only work 
when combined with the coverage requirement and tax credits. It thus 
stands to reason that Congress meant for those provisions to apply in 
every State as well.Pp. 15-19.


(d) The structure of Section 36B itself also suggests that tax creditsare 
not limited to State Exchanges. Together, Section 36B(a), which allows tax 
credits for any "applicable taxpayer," and Section36B(c)(1), which defines 
that term as someone with a household income between 100 percent and 400 
percent of the federal povertyline, appear to make anyone in the specified 
income range eligible fora tax credit. According to petitioners, however, 
those provisions are an empty promise in States with a Federal Exchange. 
In their view, an applicable taxpayer in such a State would be eligible 
for a tax credit, but the amount of that tax credit would always be zero 
because of two provisions buried deep within the Tax Code. That argument 
fails because Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions." Whitman v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457. Pp. 19-
20.


(e) Petitioners' plain-meaning arguments are strong, but the Act'scontext 
and structure compel the conclusion that Section 36B allows tax credits 
for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under the Act. Those 
credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges tofunction like their 
State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid thetype of calamitous result 
that Congress plainly meant to avoid.Pp. 20-21.
759 F. 3d 358, affirmed.


ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KEN5
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) Syllabus NEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, 
and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined

Site as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in 
thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested 
tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in 
orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 14-114

DAVID KING, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2015]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of theCourt.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act adopts a series of 
interlocking reforms designed to expand coveragein the individual health 
insurance market. First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person's 
health into accountwhen deciding whether to sell health insurance or how 
much to charge. Second, the Act generally requires each person to maintain 
insurance coverage or make a payment to the Internal Revenue Service. And 
third, the Act gives tax credits to certain people to make insurance 
moreaffordable.

In addition to those reforms, the Act requires the creation of an 
"Exchange" in each State-basically, a marketplace that allows people to 
compare and purchase insurance plans. The Act gives each State the 
opportunity toestablish its own Exchange, but provides that the Federal 
Government will establish the Exchange if the State does not.
This case is about whether the Act's interlocking re2

KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

forms apply equally in each State no matter who establishes the State's 
Exchange. Specifically, the question pre- sented is whether the Act's tax 
credits are available in States that have a Federal Exchange.
I
A

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, grew out of 
a long history of failed health insurance reform. In the 1990s, several 
States began experimenting with ways to expand people's access to 
coverage.One common approach was to impose a pair of insurancemarket 
regulations-a "guaranteed issue" requirement,which barred insurers from 
denying coverage to any person because of his health, and a "community 
rating" requirement, which barred insurers from charging a personhigher 
premiums for the same reason. Together, those requirements were designed 
to ensure that anyone whowanted to buy health insurance could do so.
The guaranteed issue and community rating requirements achieved that goal, 
but they had an unintended consequence: They encouraged people to wait 
until theygot sick to buy insurance. Why buy insurance coverage when you 
are healthy, if you can buy the same coveragefor the same price when you 
become ill? This consequence-known as "adverse selection"-led to a second: 
Insurers were forced to increase premiums to account for the fact that, 
more and more, it was the sick rather than the healthy who were buying 
insurance. And that consequence fed back into the first: As the cost of 
insurance rose, even more people waited until they became ill tobuy it.
This led to an economic "death spiral." As premiums rose higher and 
higher, and the number of people buying insurance sank lower and lower, 
insurers began to leave the market entirely. As a result, the number of 
people

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Opinion of the Court

without insurance increased dramatically.

This cycle happened repeatedly during the 1990s. For example, in 1993, the 
State of Washington reformed itsindividual insurance market by adopting 
the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. Over the next 
three years, premiums rose by 78 percent and the numberof people enrolled 
fell by 25 percent. By 1999, 17 of theState's 19 private insurers had left 
the market, and theremaining two had announced their intention to do so. 
Brief for America's Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae 10-11.
For another example, also in 1993, New York adopted the guaranteed issue 
and community rating requirements. Over the next few years, some major 
insurers in the individual market raised premiums by roughly 40 percent. 
By1996, these reforms had "effectively eliminated the commercial 
individual indemnity market in New York withthe largest individual health 
insurer exiting the market."

L. Wachenheim & H. Leida, The Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community 
Rating Reforms on States' Individual Insurance Markets 38 (2012).

In 1996, Massachusetts adopted the guaranteed issueand community rating 
requirements and experienced similar results. But in 2006, Massachusetts 
added two more reforms: The Commonwealth required individuals to buy 
insurance or pay a penalty, and it gave tax credits tocertain individuals 
to ensure that they could afford the insurance they were required to buy. 
Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 24-25. The 
combination of these three reforms-insurance market regulations, a 
coverage mandate, and tax credits-reduced the uninsured rate in 
Massachusetts to 2.6 percent, by far the lowest in the Nation. Hearing on 
Examining IndividualState Experiences with Health Care Reform 
CoverageInitiatives in the Context of National Reform before the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and

4 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

Pensions, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (2009).

B The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key reforms that 
made the Massachusetts system successful. First, the Act adopts the 
guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. The Act provides that 
"eachhealth insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the 
individual . . . market in a State must accept every . . . individual in 
the State that applies for suchcoverage." 42 U. S. C. 300gg-1(a). The Act 
also bars insurers from charging higher premiums on the basis of a 
person's health. 300gg.Second, the Act generally requires individuals to 
maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to theIRS. 26 U. S. 
C. 5000A. Congress recognized that, without an incentive, "many 
individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed 
care." 42
U. S. C. 18091(2)(I). So Congress adopted a coverage requirement to 
"minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk 
pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance 
premiums." Ibid. In Congress's view, that coverage requirement 
was"essential to creating effective health insurance markets." Ibid. 
Congress also provided an exemption from the coverage requirement for 
anyone who has to spend more thaneight percent of his income on health 
insurance. 26

U. S. C. 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii).

Third, the Act seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving 
refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes between 100 
percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. 36B. Individuals who 
meet the Act's requirements may purchase insurance with the tax credits, 
which are provided in advance directly to the individual's insurer. 42 U. 
S. C. 18081, 18082.

These three reforms are closely intertwined. As noted,

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

Opinion of the Court

Congress found that the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements 
would not work without the coveragerequirement. 18091(2)(I). And the 
coverage requirementwould not work without the tax credits. The reason is 
that, without the tax credits, the cost of buying insurancewould exceed 
eight percent of income for a large number of individuals, which would 
exempt them from the coverage requirement. Given the relationship between 
these three reforms, the Act provided that they should take effect onthe 
same day-January 1, 2014. See Affordable Care Act,1253, redesignated 1255, 
124 Stat. 162, 895; 1401(e),1501(d), id., at 220, 249.

C In addition to those three reforms, the Act requires the creation of an 
"Exchange" in each State where peoplecan shop for insurance, usually 
online. 42 U. S. C. 18031(b)(1). An Exchange may be created in one of two 
ways. First, the Act provides that "[e]ach State shall . . . establish an 
American Health Benefit Exchange . . . for the State." Ibid. Second, if a 
State nonetheless chooses not to establish its own Exchange, the Act 
provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall . . 
.establish and operate such Exchange within the State." 18041(c)(1).The 
issue in this case is whether the Act's tax credits are available in 
States that have a Federal Exchangerather than a State Exchange. The Act 
initially providesthat tax credits "shall be allowed" for any "applicable 
taxpayer." 26 U. S. C. 36B(a). The Act then providesthat the amount of the 
tax credit depends in part on whether the taxpayer has enrolled in an 
insurance plan through "an Exchange established by the State under section 
1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter 42 U. 
S. C. 18031]." 26 U. S. C. 36B(b)-(c) (emphasis added).

6 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

The IRS addressed the availability of tax credits bypromulgating a rule 
that made them available on both State and Federal Exchanges. 77 Fed. Reg. 
30378 (2012).As relevant here, the IRS Rule provides that a taxpayer 
iseligible for a tax credit if he enrolled in an insurance plan through 
"an Exchange," 26 CFR 1.36B-2 (2013), which is defined as "an Exchange 
serving the individual market . . . regardless of whether the Exchange is 
established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS," 45 CFR 155.20 
(2014). At this point, 16 States and the District of Columbia have 
established their own Exchanges; the other 34States have elected to have 
HHS do so.

D Petitioners are four individuals who live in Virginia,which has a 
Federal Exchange. They do not wish to purchase health insurance. In their 
view, Virginia's Exchange does not qualify as "an Exchange established by 
the State under [42 U. S. C. 18031]," so they should not receive any tax 
credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance more than eight 
percent of their income,which would exempt them from the Act's coverage 
requirement. 26 U. S. C. 5000A(e)(1). Under the IRS Rule, however, 
Virginia's Exchange would qualify as "an Exchange established by the State 
under [42 U. S. C. 18031]," so petitioners would receive tax credits. That 
would make the cost of buying insurance less than eight percent of 
petitioners' income, which would subject them to the Act's coverage 
requirement.

The IRS Rule therefore requires petitioners to either buy healthinsurance 
they do not want, or make a payment to the IRS. Petitioners challenged the 
IRS Rule in Federal DistrictCourt. The District Court dismissed the suit, 
holding that the Act unambiguously made tax credits available to 
individuals enrolled through a Federal Exchange. King v.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7

Opinion of the Court

Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (ED Va. 2014). The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed. 759 F. 3d 358 (2014). The Fourth Circuit viewed 
the Act as "ambiguousand subject to at least two different 
interpretations." Id., at 372. The court therefore deferred to the IRS's 
interpretation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). 759 F. 3d, at
376.

The same day that the Fourth Circuit issued its decision, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the IRS Rule in a 
different case, holding that the Act "unambiguously restricts" the tax 
credits to State Exchanges. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F. 3d 390, 394 (2014). 
We granted certiorari in the present case. 574
U. S. ___ (2014).

II The Affordable Care Act addresses tax credits in what is now Section 
36B of the Internal Revenue Code. That section provides: "In the case of 
an applicable taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax 
imposed by this subtitle . . . an amount equal to the premium assistance 
credit amount." 26 U. S. C. 36B(a). Section 36B then defines the term 
"premium assistance credit amount"as "the sum of the premium assistance 
amounts determined under paragraph (2) with respect to all coverage months 
of the taxpayer occurring during the taxable year." 36B(b)(1) (emphasis 
added). Section 36B goes on to define the two italicized terms-"premium 
assistance amount" and "coverage month"-in part by referring to 
aninsurance plan that is enrolled in through "an Exchangeestablished by 
the State under [42 U. S. C. 18031]." 26

U. S. C. 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i).

The parties dispute whether Section 36B authorizes taxcredits for 
individuals who enroll in an insurance planthrough a Federal Exchange. 
Petitioners argue that a

8 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

Federal Exchange is not "an Exchange established by the State under [42 U. 
S. C. 18031]," and that the IRS Rule therefore contradicts Section 36B. 
Brief for Petitioners 18-20. The Government responds that the IRS Rule is 
lawful because the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [42 
U. S. C. 18031]" should be read toinclude Federal Exchanges. Brief for 
Respondents 20-25.

When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute,we often apply the 
two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. Under that 
framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the 
agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 842-843. This approach "is 
premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit 
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps." FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000). "In 
extraordinary cases, however, there may bereason to hesitate before 
concluding that Congress hasintended such an implicit delegation." Ibid.
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act's key 
reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting 
the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those 
credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of 
deep"economic and political significance" that is central to this 
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an 
agency, it surely would have done so expressly. Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 19) (quoting Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U. S., at 160). It is especially unlikely that Congress 
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in 
crafting health insurance policy of this sort. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U. S. 243, 266-267 (2006). This is not a case for the IRS.

It is instead our task to determine the correct reading ofSection 36B. If 
the statutory language is plain, we must

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 9

Opinion of the Court

enforce it according to its terms. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). But oftentimes the "meaning-or 
ambiguity-of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed 
in context." Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 132. So when 
decidingwhether the language is plain, we must read the words "in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." 
Id., at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our duty, after all, is 
"to construe statutes, not isolated provisions." Graham County Soil and 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559

U. S. 280, 290 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A We begin with the text of Section 36B. As relevant here, Section 36B 
allows an individual to receive tax credits only if the individual enrolls 
in an insurance plan through"an Exchange established by the State under 
[42 U. S. C. 18031]." In other words, three things must be true: First,the 
individual must enroll in an insurance plan through"an Exchange." Second, 
that Exchange must be "established by the State." And third, that Exchange 
must beestablished "under [42 U. S. C. 18031]." We address each 
requirement in turn.First, all parties agree that a Federal Exchange 
qualifies as "an Exchange" for purposes of Section 36B. See Brief for 
Petitioners 22; Brief for Respondents 22. Section 18031 provides that 
"[e]ach State shall . . . establish anAmerican Health Benefit Exchange . . 
. for the State." 18031(b)(1). Although phrased as a requirement, the Act 
gives the States "flexibility" by allowing them to "elect" whether they 
want to establish an Exchange. 18041(b). If the State chooses not to do 
so, Section 18041 providesthat the Secretary "shall . . . establish and 
operate such Exchange within the State." 18041(c)(1) (emphasisadded).

10 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

By using the phrase "such Exchange," Section 18041 instructs the Secretary 
to establish and operate the same Exchange that the State was directed to 
establish underSection 18031. See Black's Law Dictionary 1661 (10th ed. 
2014) (defining "such" as "That or those; having just beenmentioned"). In 
other words, State Exchanges and Fed- eral Exchanges are equivalent-they 
must meet the same requirements, perform the same functions, and serve the 
same purposes. Although State and Federal Exchangesare established by 
different sovereigns, Sections 18031 and 18041 do not suggest that they 
differ in any meaningful way. A Federal Exchange therefore counts as 
"anExchange" under Section 36B.

Second, we must determine whether a Federal Exchange is "established by 
the State" for purposes of Section 36B. At the outset, it might seem that 
a FederalExchange cannot fulfill this requirement. After all, the Act 
defines "State" to mean "each of the 50 States and the District of 
Columbia"-a definition that does not include the Federal Government. 42 U. 
S. C. 18024(d). But when read in context, "with a view to [its] place in 
theoverall statutory scheme," the meaning of the phrase"established by the 
State" is not so clear. Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 133 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).

After telling each State to establish an Exchange, Section 18031 provides 
that all Exchanges "shall make available qualified health plans to 
qualified individuals." 42

U. S. C. 18031(d)(2)(A). Section 18032 then defines the term "qualified 
individual" in part as an individual who "resides in the State that 
established the Exchange."18032(f)(1)(A). And that's a problem: If we give 
the phrase "the State that established the Exchange" its mostnatural 
meaning, there would be no "qualified individuals"on Federal Exchanges. 
But the Act clearly contemplates that there will be qualified individuals 
on every Exchange.

11 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

As we just mentioned, the Act requires all Exchanges to"make available 
qualified health plans to qualified individuals"-something an Exchange 
could not do if there were no such individuals. 18031(d)(2)(A). And the 
Act tells the Exchange, in deciding which health plans to offer, to 
consider "the interests of qualified individuals . . . in theState or 
States in which such Exchange operates"-again, something the Exchange 
could not do if qualified individuals did not exist. 18031(e)(1)(B). This 
problem arises repeatedly throughout the Act. See, e.g., 
18031(b)(2)(allowing a State to create "one Exchange . . . for providing . 
. . services to both qualified individuals and qualified small employers," 
rather than creating separate Exchangesfor those two groups).1

These provisions suggest that the Act may not alwaysuse the phrase 
"established by the State" in its most natural sense. Thus, the meaning of 
that phrase may not be as clear as it appears when read out of context.
Third, we must determine whether a Federal Exchangeis established "under 
[42 U. S. C. 18031]." This too might seem a requirement that a Federal 
Exchange cannot fulfill, because it is Section 18041 that tells the 
Secretary when to "establish and operate such Exchange." But here again, 
the way different provisions in the statute interact suggests otherwise.

The Act defines the term "Exchange" to mean "an American Health Benefit 
Exchange established under section18031." 300gg-91(d)(21). If we import 
that definition
------ 1The dissent argues that one would "naturally read instructions 
about qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a particular 
Exchange has no such individuals." Post, at 10-11 (SCALIA, J., 
dissenting). But the fact that the dissent's interpretation would make so 
manyparts of the Act "inapplicable" to Federal Exchanges is precisely what 
creates the problem. It would be odd indeed for Congress to write such 
detailed instructions about customers on a State Exchange, while having 
nothing to say about those on a Federal Exchange.

12 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

into Section 18041, the Act tells the Secretary to "establish and operate 
such 'American Health Benefit Exchangeestablished under section 18031.'" 
That suggests that Section 18041 authorizes the Secretary to establish 
anExchange under Section 18031, not (or not only) under Section 18041. 
Otherwise, the Federal Exchange, bydefinition, would not be an "Exchange" 
at all. See Halbig, 758 F. 3d, at 399-400 (acknowledging that the 
Secretary establishes Federal Exchanges under Section 18031).

This interpretation of "under [42 U. S. C. 18031]" fits best with the 
statutory context. All of the requirementsthat an Exchange must meet are 
in Section 18031, so it issensible to regard all Exchanges as established 
under thatprovision. In addition, every time the Act uses the 
word"Exchange," the definitional provision requires that we substitute the 
phrase "Exchange established under section 18031." If Federal Exchanges 
were not established under Section 18031, therefore, literally none of the 
Act's requirements would apply to them. Finally, the Act repeatedly uses 
the phrase "established under [42 U. S. C.18031]" in situations where it 
would make no sense to distinguish between State and Federal Exchanges. 
See, e.g., 26 U. S. C. 125(f)(3)(A) (2012 ed., Supp. I) ("The 
term'qualified benefit' shall not include any qualified healthplan . . . 
offered through an Exchange established under [42 U. S. C. 18031]"); 26 U. 
S. C. 6055(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(2012 ed.) (requiring insurers to report 
whether eachinsurance plan they provided "is a qualified health 
planoffered through an Exchange established under [42

U. S. C. 18031]"). A Federal Exchange may therefore be considered one 
established "under [42 U. S. C. 18031]."
The upshot of all this is that the phrase "an Exchangeestablished by the 
State under [42 U. S. C. 18031]" isproperly viewed as ambiguous. The 
phrase may be limited in its reach to State Exchanges. But it is also 
possible that the phrase refers to all Exchanges-both State and

13 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

Federal-at least for purposes of the tax credits. If a State chooses not 
to follow the directive in Section 18031 that it establish an Exchange, 
the Act tells the Secretary to establish "such Exchange." 18041. And by 
using thewords "such Exchange," the Act indicates that State and Federal 
Exchanges should be the same. But State and Federal Exchanges would differ 
in a fundamental way if tax credits were available only on State 
Exchanges-one type of Exchange would help make insurance more affordable 
by providing billions of dollars to the States' citizens; the other type 
of Exchange would not.2

The conclusion that Section 36B is ambiguous is furthersupported by 
several provisions that assume tax creditswill be available on both State 
and Federal Exchanges. For example, the Act requires all Exchanges to 
create outreach programs that must "distribute fair and impartial 
information concerning . . . the availability of premium tax credits under 
section 36B." 18031(i)(3)(B). The Act also requires all Exchanges to 
"establish and make avail- able by electronic means a calculator to 
determine theactual cost of coverage after the application of any premium 
tax credit under section 36B." 18031(d)(4)(G). And the Act requires all 
Exchanges to report to the Treasury Secretary information about each 
health plan they sell,

------ 2The dissent argues that the phrase "such Exchange" does not 
suggest that State and Federal Exchanges "are in all respects equivalent." 
Post, at 8. In support, it quotes the Constitution's Elections Clause, 
which makes the state legislature primarily responsible for 
prescribingelection regulations, but allows Congress to "make or alter 
such Regulations." Art. I, 4, cl. 1. No one would say that state and 
federalelection regulations are in all respects equivalent, the dissent 
contends,so we should not say that State and Federal Exchanges are. But 
the Elections Clause does not precisely define what an election regulation 
must look like, so Congress can prescribe regulations that differ fromwhat 
the State would prescribe. The Affordable Care Act does precisely define 
what an Exchange must look like, however, so a Federal Exchange cannot 
differ from a State Exchange.

14 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

including the "aggregate amount of any advance payment of such credit," 
"[a]ny information . . . necessary to determine eligibility for, and the 
amount of, such credit," andany "[i]nformation necessary to determine 
whether a taxpayer has received excess advance payments." 26

U. S. C. 36B(f)(3). If tax credits were not available on Federal 
Exchanges, these provisions would make little sense.

Petitioners and the dissent respond that the words"established by the 
State" would be unnecessary if Congress meant to extend tax credits to 
both State and Fed- eral Exchanges. Brief for Petitioners 20; post, at 
4-5. But "our preference for avoiding surplusage constructions isnot 
absolute." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 536 (2004); see 
also Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., 
at 13) ("The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule"). And 
specifically with respect to this Act, rigorous application of thecanon 
does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair construction of the 
statute.

The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful 
drafting. (To cite just one, the Actcreates three separate Section 1563s. 
See 124 Stat. 270, 911, 912.) Several features of the Act's passage 
contributed to that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote key parts of the 
Act behind closed doors, rather than through "the traditional legislative 
process." Cannan, A LegislativeHistory of the Affordable Care Act: How 
Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. Lib. J. 131, 
163(2013). And Congress passed much of the Act using a complicated 
budgetary procedure known as "reconciliation," which limited opportunities 
for debate and amendment, and bypassed the Senate's normal 60-vote 
filibuster requirement. Id., at 159-167. As a result, the Act does not 
reflect the type of care and deliberation that one mightexpect of such 
significant legislation. Cf. Frankfurter,

15 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.Rev. 527, 545 
(1947) (describing a cartoon "in which asenator tells his colleagues 'I 
admit this new bill is toocomplicated to understand. We'll just have to 
pass it tofind out what it means.'").

Anyway, we "must do our best, bearing in mind thefundamental canon of 
statutory construction that thewords of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." 
Util- ity Air Regulatory Group, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). After reading Section36B along with 
other related provisions in the Act, wecannot conclude that the phrase "an 
Exchange establishedby the State under [Section 18031]" is unambiguous.

B Given that the text is ambiguous, we must turn to thebroader structure 
of the Act to determine the meaning ofSection 36B. "A provision that may 
seem ambiguous inisolation is often clarified by the remainder of the 
statu- tory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 
law." United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 
Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). Here, the statutory scheme compels us to 
reject petitioners' interpretation because it would destabilize the 
individual insurance market in any State with a FederalExchange, and 
likely create the very "death spirals" thatCongress designed the Act to 
avoid. See New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 
405, 419-420 (1973) ("We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their 
own stated purposes.").3 ------ 3The dissent notes that several other 
provisions in the Act use thephrase "established by the State," and argues 
that our holding appliesto each of those provisions. Post, at 5-6. But 
"the presumption ofconsistent usage readily yields to context," and a 
statutory term may

16 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

As discussed above, Congress based the Affordable CareAct on three major 
reforms: first, the guaranteed issueand community rating requirements; 
second, a requirement that individuals maintain health insurance 
coverageor make a payment to the IRS; and third, the tax creditsfor 
individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of 
the federal poverty line. In a State that establishes its own Exchange, 
these threereforms work together to expand insurance coverage. The 
guaranteed issue and community rating requirementsensure that anyone can 
buy insurance; the coverage requirement creates an incentive for people to 
do so beforethey get sick; and the tax credits-it is hoped-make insurance 
more affordable. Together, those reforms "minimize . . . adverse selection 
and broaden the health in- surance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, whichwill lower health insurance premiums." 42 U. S. C. 
18091(2)(I).

Under petitioners' reading, however, the Act wouldoperate quite 
differently in a State with a Federal Exchange. As they see it, one of the 
Act's three major reforms-the tax credits-would not apply. And a second 
major reform-the coverage requirement-would not apply in a meaningful way. 
As explained earlier, the coverage requirement applies only when the cost 
of buyinghealth insurance (minus the amount of the tax credits) isless 
than eight percent of an individual's income. 26

U. S. C. 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii). So without the tax credits, the 
coverage requirement would apply to fewer individuals. And it would be a 
lot fewer. In 2014, approx------
mean different things in different places. Utility Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 15) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). That is particularly true when, as here, "the Act is far 
from a chef d'oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship." Ibid. Because the 
other provisions cited by the dissent are not at issue here, we do not 
address them.

17 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

imately 87 percent of people who bought insurance on a Federal Exchange 
did so with tax credits, and virtually allof those people would become 
exempt. HHS, A. Burke, A. Misra, & S. Sheingold, Premium Affordability, 
Competition, and Choice in the Health Insurance Marketplace 5 (2014); 
Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 19-20. If 
petitioners are right, therefore, only oneof the Act's three major reforms 
would apply in Stateswith a Federal Exchange.
The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement 
could well push a State's individualinsurance market into a death spiral. 
One study predictsthat premiums would increase by 47 percent and 
enrollment would decrease by 70 percent. E. Saltzman & C. Eibner, The 
Effect of Eliminating the Affordable CareAct's Tax Credits in Federally 
Facilitated Marketplaces (2015). Another study predicts that premiums 
would increase by 35 percent and enrollment would decrease by69 percent. 
L. Blumberg, M. Buettgens, & J. Holahan,The Implications of a Supreme 
Court Finding for thePlaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More 
Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums (2015). And those effects would not be 
limited to individuals who purchase insurance on the Exchanges. Because 
the Act requires insurersto treat the entire individual market as a single 
risk pool, 42 U. S. C. 18032(c)(1), premiums outside the Exchange would 
rise along with those inside the Exchange. Brief for Bipartisan Economic 
Scholars as Amici Curiae 11-12.

It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. 
See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 
___, ___ (2012) (SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting) 
(slip op.,at 60) ("Without the federal subsidies . . . the exchangeswould 
not operate as Congress intended and may notoperate at all."). Congress 
made the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements applicable in 
every State

18 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

in the Nation. But those requirements only work whencombined with the 
coverage requirement and the tax credits. So it stands to reason that 
Congress meant forthose provisions to apply in every State as well.4
Petitioners respond that Congress was not worriedabout the effects of 
withholding tax credits from Stateswith Federal Exchanges because 
"Congress evidentlybelieved it was offering states a deal they would not 
refuse." Brief for Petitioners 36. Congress may have beenwrong about the 
States' willingness to establish their own Exchanges, petitioners 
continue, but that does not allow this Court to rewrite the Act to fix 
that problem. That is particularly true, petitioners conclude, because the 
Stateslikely would have created their own Exchanges in the absence of the 
IRS Rule, which eliminated any incentivethat the States had to do so. Id., 
at 36-38.

Section 18041 refutes the argument that Congressbelieved it was offering 
the States a deal they would not -----

- 4The dissent argues that our analysis "show[s] only that the statutory 
scheme contains a flaw," one "that appeared as well in other partsof the 
Act." Post, at 14. For support, the dissent notes that the guaranteed 
issue and community rating requirements might apply in thefederal 
territories, even though the coverage requirement does not. Id., at 14-
15. The confusion arises from the fact that the guaranteed issueand 
community rating requirements were added as amendments to thePublic Health 
Service Act, which contains a definition of the word "State" that includes 
the territories, 42 U. S. C. 201(f), while the later-enacted Affordable 
Care Act contains a definition of the word "State" that excludes the 
territories, 18024(d). The predicate for the dissent's point is therefore 
uncertain at best. The dissent also notes that a different part of the Act 
"established along-term-care insurance program with guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating requirements, but without an individual mandate or 
subsidies." Post, at 14. True enough. But the fact that Congress was 
willing to accept the risk of adverse selection in a comparatively minor 
program does not show that Congress was willing to do so in the 
generalhealth insurance program-the very heart of the Act. Moreover, 
Congress said expressly that it wanted to avoid adverse selection in the 
health insurance markets. 18091(2)(I).

19 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

refuse. That section provides that, if a State elects not toestablish an 
Exchange, the Secretary "shall . . . establishand operate such Exchange 
within the State." 42 U. S. C. 18041(c)(1)(A). The whole point of that 
provision is tocreate a federal fallback in case a State chooses not to 
establish its own Exchange. Contrary to petitioners' argument, Congress 
did not believe it was offering Statesa deal they would not refuse-it 
expressly addressed what would happen if a State did refuse the deal.

C Finally, the structure of Section 36B itself suggests thattax credits 
are not limited to State Exchanges. Section 36B(a) initially provides that 
tax credits "shall be allowed" for any "applicable taxpayer." Section 
36B(c)(1) then defines an "applicable taxpayer" as someone who (among 
other things) has a household income between 100 percent and 400 percent 
of the federal poverty line. Together,these two provisions appear to make 
anyone in the specified income range eligible to receive a tax 
credit.According to petitioners, however, those provisions are an empty 
promise in States with a Federal Exchange. In their view, an applicable 
taxpayer in such a State would be eligible for a tax credit-but the amount 
of that tax credit would always be zero. And that is because-diving 
several layers down into the Tax Code-Section 36B says that the amount of 
the tax credits shall be "an amount equal to the premium assistance credit 
amount," 36B(a);and then says that the term "premium assistance 
creditamount" means "the sum of the premium assistance amounts determined 
under paragraph (2) with respect to all coverage months of the taxpayer 
occurring during the taxable year," 36B(b)(1); and then says that the 
term"premium assistance amount" is tied to the amount of themonthly 
premium for insurance purchased on "an Exchange established by the State 
under [42 U. S. C.

20 KING v. BURWELL

Opinion of the Court

18031]," 36B(b)(2); and then says that the term "coverage month" means any 
month in which the taxpayer has insurance through "an Exchange established 
by the Stateunder [42 U. S. C. 18031]," 36B(c)(2)(A)(i).
We have held that Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms orancillary provisions." Whitman v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). But in 
petitioners'view, Congress made the viability of the entire AffordableCare 
Act turn on the ultimate ancillary provision: a sub-sub-sub section of the 
Tax Code. We doubt that is what Congress meant to do. Had Congress meant 
to limit tax credits to State Exchanges, it likely would have done so 
inthe definition of "applicable taxpayer" or in some other prominent 
manner. It would not have used such a winding path of connect-the-dots 
provisions about the amountof the credit.5
D Petitioners' arguments about the plain meaning ofSection 36B are strong. 
But while the meaning of thephrase "an Exchange established by the State 
under [42
U. S. C. 18031]" may seem plain "when viewed in isolation," such a reading 
turns out to be "untenable in light of[the statute] as a whole." 
Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332, 343 
(1994). In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us 
todepart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the 
pertinent statutory phrase.

------ 5The dissent cites several provisions that "make[ ] taxpayers of 
allStates eligible for a credit, only to provide later that the amount of 
the credit may be zero." Post, at 11 (citing 26 U. S. C. 24, 32, 35, 36). 
None of those provisions, however, is crucial to the viability of a 
comprehensive program like the Affordable Care Act. No one suggests, 
forexample, that the first-time-homebuyer tax credit, 36, is essential to 
the viability of federal housing regulation.

21 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opinion of the Court

Reliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is a "subtle 
business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere 
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation 
becomes legislation itself." Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 83 
(1939).For the reasons we have given, however, such reliance isappropriate 
in this case, and leads us to conclude that Section 36B allows tax credits 
for insurance purchased onany Exchange created under the Act. Those 
credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like 
theirState Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous 
result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.
* * * In a democracy, the power to make the law rests withthose chosen by 
the people. Our role is more confined-"to say what the law is." Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in 
others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and 
take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation 
demands a fair understanding of thelegislative plan.Congress passed the 
Affordable Care Act to improvehealth insurance markets, not to destroy 
them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is 
consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly 
be read consistent with what we see as Congress's plan, and that is the 
reading we adopt.The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed.


_________________
_________________


Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1
SCALIA, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-114
DAVID KING, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. SYLVIA
BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, 
dissenting.
The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
says "Exchange established by theState" it means "Exchange established by 
the State or theFederal Government." That is of course quite absurd, and 
the Court's 21 pages of explanation make it no less so.
I The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes major reforms to 
the American health-insurance market.It provides, among other things, that 
every State "shall . . .establish an American Health Benefit Exchange"-a 
marketplace where people can shop for health-insurance plans. 42 U. S. C. 
18031(b)(1). And it provides that if aState does not comply with this 
instruction, the Secretaryof Health and Human Services must "establish and 
operate such Exchange within the State." 18041(c)(1). A separate part of 
the Act-housed in 36B of the Internal Revenue Code-grants "premium tax 
credits" to subsidize certain purchases of health insurance made on 
Exchanges. The tax credit consists of "premium assistanceamounts" for 
"coverage months." 26 U. S. C. 36B(b)(1). An individual has a coverage 
month only when he is cov2

KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting
ered by an insurance plan "that was enrolled in through an Exchange 
established by the State under [18031]." 36B(c)(2)(A). And the law ties 
the size of the premiumassistance amount to the premiums for health plans 
whichcover the individual "and which were enrolled in throughan Exchange 
established by the State under [18031]." 36B(b)(2)(A). The premium 
assistance amount further depends on the cost of certain other insurance 
plans "offered through the same Exchange." 36B(b)(3)(B)(i).

This case requires us to decide whether someone who buys insurance on an 
Exchange established by the Secretary gets tax credits. You would think 
the answer would be obvious-so obvious there would hardly be a need for 
the Supreme Court to hear a case about it. In order to receive any money 
under 36B, an individual must enrollin an insurance plan through an 
"Exchange established by the State." The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services is not a State. So an Exchange established by the Secretary is 
not an Exchange established by the State-whichmeans people who buy health 
insurance through such anExchange get no money under 36B.
Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a 
State is "established by the State." It is hard to come up with a clearer 
way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words 
"established by the State." And it is hard to come up with a reason to 
include the words "by the State" other than the purpose of limiting 
credits to state Exchanges. "[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of 
a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense 
that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study 
of anacute and powerful intellect would discover." Lynch v. 
Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364, 370 (1925) (internalquotation marks 
omitted). Under all the usual rules of interpretation, in short, the 
Government should lose this case. But normal rules of interpretation seem 
always to

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3
SCALIA, J., dissenting

yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable 
Care Act must be saved.
II The Court interprets 36B to award tax credits on both federal and state 
Exchanges. It accepts that the "most natural sense" of the phrase 
"Exchange established by theState" is an Exchange established by a State. 
Ante, at 11. (Understatement, thy name is an opinion on the Afford- able 
Care Act!) Yet the opinion continues, with no semblance of shame, that "it 
is also possible that the phrase refers to all Exchanges-both State and 
Federal." Ante, at
13. (Impossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care 
Act!) The Court claims that "the context and structure of the Act compel 
[it] to depart from whatwould otherwise be the most natural reading of the 
pertinent statutory phrase." Ante, at 21.

I wholeheartedly agree with the Court that sound interpretation requires 
paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or even 
isolated sections. Context always matters. Let us not forget, however, 
whycontext matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms ofthe law, 
not an excuse for rewriting them.
Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a lawmust accept and apply 
the presumption that lawmakers use words in "their natural and ordinary 
signification." Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 
U. S. 1, 12 (1878). Ordinary connotation does notalways prevail, but the 
more unnatural the proposed interpretation of a law, the more compelling 
the contex- tual evidence must be to show that it is correct. 
Today'sinterpretation is not merely unnatural; it is unheard of.Who would 
ever have dreamt that "Exchange established by the State" means "Exchange 
established by the State or the Federal Government"? Little short of an 
express statutory definition could justify adopting this singular reading.

4 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Yet the only pertinent definition here provides that "State"means "each of 
the 50 States and the District of Columbia." 42 U. S. C. 18024(d). Because 
the Secretary isneither one of the 50 States nor the District of Columbia, 
that definition positively contradicts the eccentric theory that an 
Exchange established by the Secretary has been established by the State.

Far from offering the overwhelming evidence of meaningneeded to justify 
the Court's interpretation, other contextual clues undermine it at every 
turn. To begin with,other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between the 
establishment of an Exchange by a State and the establishment of an 
Exchange by the Federal Government. The States' authority to set up 
Exchanges comes from oneprovision, 18031(b); the Secretary's authority 
comes froman entirely different provision, 18041(c). Funding forStates to 
establish Exchanges comes from one part of thelaw, 18031(a); funding for 
the Secretary to establishExchanges comes from an entirely different part 
of thelaw, 18121. States generally run state-created Exchanges; the 
Secretary generally runs federally created Exchanges. 18041(b)-(c). And 
the Secretary's authority to set up an Exchange in a State depends upon 
the State's"[f]ailure to establish [an] Exchange." 18041(c) (emphasis 
added). Provisions such as these destroy any pretensethat a federal 
Exchange is in some sense also established by a State.

Reading the rest of the Act also confirms that, as relevant here, there 
are only two ways to set up an Exchangein a State: establishment by a 
State and establishment bythe Secretary. 18031(b), 18041(c). So saying 
that anExchange established by the Federal Government is "established by 
the State" goes beyond giving words bizarremeanings; it leaves the 
limiting phrase "by the State" withno operative effect at all. That is a 
stark violation of the elementary principle that requires an interpreter 
"to give

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Montclair v. 
Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883). In weighing this argument, it is well 
to remember the difference between giving a term a meaning that 
duplicatesanother part of the law, and giving a term no meaning atall. 
Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselves-whetherout of a desire to add 
emphasis, a sense of belt-andsuspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant 
for doublets (aid and abet, cease and desist, null and void). Lawmakers do 
not, however, tend to use terms that "have no operation at all." Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803). So while the rule against treating a 
term as a redundancy is far from categorical, the rule against treating it 
as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretiveprinciples get. The 
Court's reading does not merely give "by the State" a duplicative effect; 
it causes the phrase to have no effect whatever.

Making matters worse, the reader of the whole Act willcome across a number 
of provisions beyond 36B that referto the establishment of Exchanges by 
States. Adoptingthe Court's interpretation means nullifying the term "by 
the State" not just once, but again and again throughoutthe Act. Consider 
for the moment only those parts of the Act that mention an "Exchange 
established by the State" in connection with tax credits:

? The formula for calculating the amount of the taxcredit, as already 
explained, twice mentions "an Exchange established by the State." 26 U. S. 
C. 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i).

? The Act directs States to screen children for eligibility for "[tax 
credits] under section 36B" and for "anyother assistance or subsidies 
available for coverage obtained through" an "Exchange established by 
theState." 42 U. S. C. 1396w-3(b)(1)(B)-(C).

? The Act requires "an Exchange established by the
6 KING v. BURWELL
SCALIA, J., dissenting
State" to use a "secure electronic interface" to determine eligibility for 
(among other things) tax credits. 1396w-3(b)(1)(D).

? The Act authorizes "an Exchange established by the State" to make 
arrangements under which other stateagencies "determine whether a State 
resident is eligible for [tax credits] under section 36B." 1396w-3(b)(2).

? The Act directs States to operate Web sites that allow anyone "who is 
eligible to receive [tax credits] under section 36B" to compare insurance 
plans offered through "an Exchange established by the State." 
1396w-3(b)(4).

? One of the Act's provisions addresses the enrollmentof certain children 
in health plans "offered through anExchange established by the State" and 
then dis- cusses the eligibility of these children for tax credits. 
1397ee(d)(3)(B).

It is bad enough for a court to cross out "by the State" once. But seven 
times?
Congress did not, by the way, repeat "Exchange established by the State 
under [18031]" by rote throughout theAct. Quite the contrary, clause after 
clause of the law usesa more general term such as "Exchange" or 
"Exchangeestablished under [18031]." See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. 18031(k), 
18033; 26 U. S. C. 6055. It is common sense that any speaker who says 
"Exchange" some of the time, but "Exchange established by the State" the 
rest of the time, probably means something by the contrast.

Equating establishment "by the State" with establishment by the Federal 
Government makes nonsense of other parts of the Act. The Act requires 
States to ensure (on pain of losing Medicaid funding) that any 
"Exchangeestablished by the State" uses a "secure electronic interCite
as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

face" to determine an individual's eligibility for variousbenefits 
(including tax credits). 42 U. S. C. 1396w- 3(b)(1)(D). How could a State 
control the type of electronic interface used by a federal Exchange? The 
Act allows a State to control contracting decisions made by "an Exchange 
established by the State." 18031(f)(3). Whywould a State get to control 
the contracting decisions of a federal Exchange? The Act also provides 
"Assistance toStates to establish American Health Benefit Exchanges" and 
directs the Secretary to renew this funding "if theState . . . is making 
progress . . . toward . . . establishingan Exchange." 18031(a). Does a 
State that refuses to set up an Exchange still receive this funding, on 
the premisethat Exchanges established by the Federal Government are really 
established by States? It is presumably in orderto avoid these questions 
that the Court concludes that federal Exchanges count as state Exchanges 
only "forpurposes of the tax credits." Ante, at 13. (Contrivance,thy name 
is an opinion on the Affordable Care Act!)

It is probably piling on to add that the Congress that wrote the 
Affordable Care Act knew how to equate two different types of Exchanges 
when it wanted to do so. The Act includes a clause providing that "[a] 
territory that . . . establishes . . . an Exchange . . . shall be treated 
as a State" for certain purposes. 18043(a) (emphasis added).Tellingly, it 
does not include a comparable clause providing that the Secretary shall be 
treated as a State for purposes of 36B when she establishes an Exchange.

Faced with overwhelming confirmation that "Exchangeestablished by the 
State" means what it looks like it means, the Court comes up with argument 
after feeble argument to support its contrary interpretation. None of its 
tries comes close to establishing the implausible conclusion that Congress 
used "by the State" to mean "by the State or not by the State."

The Court emphasizes that if a State does not set up an

8 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Exchange, the Secretary must establish "such Exchange." 18041(c). It 
claims that the word "such" implies that federal and state Exchanges are 
"the same." Ante, at 13. To see the error in this reasoning, one need only 
consider a parallel provision from our Constitution: "The Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may 
at any time byLaw make or alter such Regulations." Art. I, 4, cl. 1 
(emphasis added). Just as the Affordable Care Act directs States to 
establish Exchanges while allowing the Secretary to establish "such 
Exchange" as a fallback, the Elections Clause directs state legislatures 
to prescribe electionregulations while allowing Congress to make "such 
Regulations" as a fallback. Would anybody refer to an electionregulation 
made by Congress as a "regulation prescribed by the state legislature"? 
Would anybody say that a federal election law and a state election law are 
in all respects equivalent? Of course not. The word "such" does not help 
the Court one whit. The Court's argument also overlooks the rudimentary 
principle that a specific provision governs a general one. Even if it were 
true that the term "such Exchange" in 18041(c) implies that federaland 
state Exchanges are the same in general, the term"established by the 
State" in 36B makes plain that they differ when it comes to tax credits in 
particular.

The Court's next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery involves other parts 
of the Act that purportedly presuppose the availability of tax credits on 
both federal and state Exchanges. Ante, at 13-14. It is curious that the 
Court is willing to subordinate the express words of the sectionthat 
grants tax credits to the mere implications of other provisions with only 
tangential connections to tax credits.One would think that interpretation 
would work the otherway around. In any event, each of the provisions 
mentioned by the Court is perfectly consistent with limiting

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

tax credits to state Exchanges. One of them says that theminimum functions 
of an Exchange include (alongside several tasks that have nothing to do 
with tax credits) setting up an electronic calculator that shows "the 
actualcost of coverage after the application of any premium taxcredit." 42 
U. S. C. 18031(d)(4)(G). What stops a federal Exchange's electronic 
calculator from telling a customer that his tax credit is zero? Another 
provision requires an Exchange's outreach program to educate the public 
about health plans, to facilitate enrollment, and to "distributefair and 
impartial information" about enrollment and "theavailability of premium 
tax credits." 18031(i)(3)(B).What stops a federal Exchange's outreach 
program fromfairly and impartially telling customers that no tax 
creditsare available? A third provision requires an Exchange to report 
information about each insurance plan sold-including level of coverage, 
premium, name of the insured,and "amount of any advance payment" of the 
tax credit.26 U. S. C. 36B(f)(3). What stops a federal Exchange'sreport 
from confirming that no tax credits have been paidout?

The Court persists that these provisions "would makelittle sense" if no 
tax credits were available on federal Exchanges.

Ante, at 14. Even if that observation were true, it would show only 
oddity, not ambiguity. Laws often include unusual or mismatched 
provisions. The Affordable Care Act spans 900 pages; it would be amazingif 
its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other.This Court "does not 
revise legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an 
apparent anomaly." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, 
___ (2014) (slip op., at 10). At any rate, the provisions cited by the 
Court are not particularly unusual. Each requires an Exchange to perform a 
standardized series of tasks, someaspects of which relate in some way to 
tax credits. It is entirely natural for slight mismatches to occur when, 
as

10 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

here, lawmakers draft "a single statutory provision" tocover "different 
kinds" of situations. Robers v. United States, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) 
(slip op., at 4). Lawmakers need not, and often do not, "write extra 
languagespecifically exempting, phrase by phrase, applications inrespect 
to which a portion of a phrase is not needed." Ibid.
Roaming even farther afield from 36B, the Court turns to the Act's 
provisions about "qualified individuals." Ante, at 10-11. Qualified 
individuals receive favored treatment on Exchanges, although customers who 
are not qualified individuals may also shop there. See Halbig v. Burwell, 
758 F. 3d 390, 404-405 (CADC 2014). The Court claims that the Act must 
equate federal and state establishment of Exchanges when it defines a 
qualified individual assomeone who (among other things) lives in the 
"State that established the Exchange," 42 U. S. C. 
18032(f)(1)(A).Otherwise, the Court says, there would be no 
qualifiedindividuals on federal Exchanges, contradicting (for example) the 
provision requiring every Exchange to take the "'interests of qualified 
individuals'" into accountwhen selecting health plans. Ante, at 11 
(quoting18031(e)(1)(b)). Pure applesauce. Imagine that a university sends 
around a bulletin reminding every professor to take the "interests of 
graduate students" into accountwhen setting office hours, but that some 
professors teachonly undergraduates. Would anybody reason that the 
bulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor has"graduate 
students," so that "graduate students" mustreally mean "graduate or 
undergraduate students"? Surely not. Just as one naturally reads 
instructions aboutgraduate students to be inapplicable to the extent a 
particular professor has no such students, so too would onenaturally read 
instructions about qualified individuals tobe inapplicable to the extent a 
particular Exchange has nosuch individuals. There is no need to rewrite 
the term "State that established the Exchange" in the definition of

11 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

SCALIA, J., dissenting

"qualified individual," much less a need to rewrite theseparate term 
"Exchange established by the State" in aseparate part of the Act.

Least convincing of all, however, is the Court's attemptto uncover support 
for its interpretation in "the structureof Section 36B itself." Ante, at 
19. The Court finds it strange that Congress limited the tax credit to 
state Exchanges in the formula for calculating the amount of the credit, 
rather than in the provision defining the range of taxpayers eligible for 
the credit. Had the Court bothered to look at the rest of the Tax Code, it 
would have seen that the structure it finds strange is in fact quite 
common. Consider, for example, the many provisions that initially make 
taxpayers of all incomes eligible for a tax credit, onlyto provide later 
that the amount of the credit is zero if the taxpayer's income exceeds a 
specified threshold. See, e.g., 26 U. S. C. 24 (child tax credit); 32 
(earned-income tax credit); 36 (first-time-homebuyer tax credit). Or 
consider, for an even closer parallel, a neighboring provision 
thatinitially makes taxpayers of all States eligible for a credit, only to 
provide later that the amount of the credit may bezero if the taxpayer's 
State does not satisfy certain requirements. See 35 
(health-insurance-costs tax credit).One begins to get the sense that the 
Court's insistence onreading things in context applies to "established by 
theState," but to nothing else.
For what it is worth, lawmakers usually draft tax-credit provisions the 
way they do-i.e., the way they drafted 36B-because the mechanics of the 
credit require it. Many Americans move to new States in the middle of the 
year. Mentioning state Exchanges in the definition of "coverage 
month"-rather than (as the Court proposes) inthe provisions concerning 
taxpayers' eligibility for the credit-accounts for taxpayers who live in a 
State with astate Exchange for a part of the year, but a State with 
afederal Exchange for the rest of the year. In addition,

12 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

36B awards a credit with respect to insurance plans "which cover the 
taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent . . . of the taxpayer 
and which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State." 
36B(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If Congress had mentioned state Exchanges 
in the provisions discussing taxpayers' eligibility for the credit, a 
taxpayer who buysinsurance from a federal Exchange would get no money,even 
if he has a spouse or dependent who buys insurance from a state 
Exchange-say a child attending college in a different State. It thus makes 
perfect sense for "Exchangeestablished by the State" to appear where it 
does, rather than where the Court suggests. Even if that were not so, of 
course, its location would not make it any less clear.
The Court has not come close to presenting the compelling contextual case 
necessary to justify departing fromthe ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the law. Quite the contrary, context only underscores the outlandishness 
ofthe Court's interpretation. Reading the Act as a wholeleaves no doubt 
about the matter: "Exchange established by the State" means what it looks 
like it means.

III For its next defense of the indefensible, the Court turns to the 
Affordable Care Act's design and purposes. As relevant here, the Act makes 
three major reforms. The guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
requirementsprohibit insurers from considering a customer's health when 
deciding whether to sell insurance and how much tocharge, 42 U. S. C. 
300gg, 300gg-1; its famous individ- ual mandate requires everyone to 
maintain insurancecoverage or to pay what the Act calls a "penalty," 26 U. 
S. C. 5000A(b)(1), and what we have nonetheless called a tax, see National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) 
(slip op., at 39); and its tax credits help make insurance more 
affordable.

13 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)

SCALIA, J., dissenting

The Court reasons that Congress intended these three reforms to "work 
together to expand insurance coverage";and because the first two apply in 
every State, so must the third. Ante, at 16.

This reasoning suffers from no shortage of flaws. To begin with, "even the 
most formidable argument concerning the statute's purposes could not 
overcome the clarity[of] the statute's text." Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U. 
S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2012) (slip op., at 14, n. 4). Statutory design 
andpurpose matter only to the extent they help clarify anotherwise 
ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintainwith a straight face that 36B is 
unclear? To mention justthe highlights, the Court's interpretation clashes 
with a statutory definition, renders words inoperative in at least seven 
separate provisions of the Act, overlooks the contrast between provisions 
that say "Exchange" and thosethat say "Exchange established by the State," 
gives the same phrase one meaning for purposes of tax credits butan 
entirely different meaning for other purposes, and (let us not forget) 
contradicts the ordinary meaning of the words Congress used. On the other 
side of the ledger, theCourt has come up with nothing more than a general 
provision that turns out to be controlled by a specific one,a handful of 
clauses that are consistent with either understanding of establishment by 
the State, and a resemblance between the tax-credit provision and the rest 
of the TaxCode. If that is all it takes to make something 
ambiguous,everything is ambiguous.

Having gone wrong in consulting statutory purpose atall, the Court goes 
wrong again in analyzing it. The purposes of a law must be "collected 
chiefly from its words,"not "from extrinsic circumstances." Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.). Onlyby 
concentrating on the law's terms can a judge hope touncover the scheme of 
the statute, rather than some other scheme that the judge thinks 
desirable. Like it or not, the

14 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

express terms of the Affordable Care Act make only two ofthe three reforms 
mentioned by the Court applicable inStates that do not establish 
Exchanges. It is perfectly possible for them to operate independently of 
tax credits. The guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements 
continue to ensure that insurance companies treat all customers the same 
no matter their health, and the individual mandate continues to encourage 
people to maintaincoverage, lest they be "taxed."

The Court protests that without the tax credits, thenumber of people 
covered by the individual mandateshrinks, and without a broadly applicable 
individual mandate the guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements 
"would destabilize the individual insurance market." Ante, at 15. If true, 
these projections would show only that the statutory scheme contains a 
flaw; they would not show that the statute means the opposite of what it 
says. Moreover, it is a flaw that appeared as well in other parts of the 
Act. A different title established a long-term-care insurance program with 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements, but without an 
individual mandate or subsidies. 8001-8002, 124 Stat. 828-847 (2010). This 
program never came into effect "only because Congress, in response to 
actuarial analyses predicting that the [program] would be fiscally 
unsustainable,repealed the provision in 2013." Halbig, 758 F. 3d, at 410. 
How could the Court say that Congress would never dream of combining 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements with a narrow 
individual mandate,when it combined those requirements with no individual 
mandate in the context of long-term-care insurance?

Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services originally 
interpreted the Act to impose guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
requirements in the FederalTerritories, even though the Act plainly does 
not make the individual mandate applicable there. Ibid.; see 26 U. S. C.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 15

SCALIA, J., dissenting

5000A(f)(4); 42 U. S. C. 201(f). "This combination, predictably, [threw] 
individual insurance markets in the territories into turmoil." Halbig, 
supra, at 410. Responding to complaints from the Territories, the 
Department atfirst insisted that it had "no statutory authority" to 
address the problem and suggested that the Territories "seek legislative 
relief from Congress" instead. Letter from G. Cohen, Director of the 
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, to S. Igisomar, 
Secretary of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands 
(July 12, 2013). The Department changed its mind a year later, after what 
it described as "a careful review of [the] situation and the relevant 
statutory language." Letter from M. Tavenner, Administrator of the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to G. Francis, Insurance Commissioner 
of the Virgin Islands (July 16, 2014). How could the Court pronounce it 
"implausible" for Congress to have tolerated instability in insurance 
markets in States with federal Exchanges, ante, at 17, when even the 
Government maintained until recently thatCongress did exactly that in 
American Samoa, Guam, theNorthern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the 
VirginIslands?

Compounding its errors, the Court forgets that it is no more appropriate 
to consider one of a statute's purposes in isolation than it is to 
consider one of its words that way.No law pursues just one purpose at all 
costs, and no statutory scheme encompasses just one element. Most relevant 
here, the Affordable Care Act displays a congressionalpreference for state 
participation in the establishment ofExchanges: Each State gets the first 
opportunity to set upits Exchange, 42 U. S. C. 18031(b); States that take 
upthe opportunity receive federal funding for "activities . . .related to 
establishing" an Exchange, 18031(a)(3); and the Secretary may establish an 
Exchange in a State only as a fallback, 18041(c). But setting up and 
running an

16 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Exchange involve significant burdens-meeting strict deadlines, 18041(b), 
implementing requirements related to the offering of insurance plans, 
18031(d)(4), setting upoutreach programs, 18031(i), and ensuring that 
theExchange is self-sustaining by 2015, 18031(d)(5)(A). A State would have 
much less reason to take on these burdens if its citizens could receive 
tax credits no matter who establishes its Exchange. (Now that the Internal 
Revenue Service has interpreted 36B to authorize tax credits everywhere, 
by the way, 34 States have failed to set up their own Exchanges. Ante, at 
6.) So even if makingcredits available on all Exchanges advances the goal 
of improving healthcare markets, it frustrates the goal of encouraging 
state involvement in the implementation of the Act. This is what justifies 
going out of our way to read"established by the State" to mean 
"established by the State or not established by the State"?

Worst of all for the repute of today's decision, the Court's reasoning is 
largely self-defeating. The Court predicts that making tax credits 
unavailable in States thatdo not set up their own Exchanges would cause 
disastrouseconomic consequences there. If that is so, however, wouldn't 
one expect States to react by setting up their ownExchanges? And wouldn't 
that outcome satisfy two of the Act's goals rather than just one: enabling 
the Act's reformsto work and promoting state involvement in the Act's 
implementation? The Court protests that the very existence of a federal 
fallback shows that Congress expected that some States might fail to set 
up their own Exchanges. Ante, at 19. So it does. It does not show, 
however, that Congress expected the number of recalcitrant States to 
beparticularly large. The more accurate the Court's dire economic 
predictions, the smaller that number is likely tobe. That reality destroys 
the
Court's pretense that applying the law as written would imperil "the 
viability of theentire Affordable Care Act." Ante, at
20. All in all, the

17 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
SCALIA, J., dissenting

Court's arguments about the law's purpose and design areno more convincing 
than its arguments about context.
IV Perhaps sensing the dismal failure of its efforts to show that 
"established by the State" means "established by theState or the Federal 
Government," the Court tries to palm off the pertinent statutory phrase as 
"inartful drafting." Ante, at 14. This Court, however, has no 
free-floatingpower "to rescue Congress from its drafting errors." Lamie v. 
United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 542 (2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Only when it is patently obvious to a reasonable reader that a 
drafting mistake has occurred may a court correct the mistake. The 
occurrence of a misprint may be apparent from the face ofthe law, as it is 
where the Affordable Care Act "creates three separate Section 1563s." 
Ante, at 14. But the Court does not pretend that there is any such 
indication of a drafting error on the face of 36B. The occurrence of a 
misprint may also be apparent because a provision decrees an absurd 
result-a consequence "so monstrous, that allmankind would, without 
hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." Sturges, 4 Wheat., at 
203. But 36B does not come remotely close to satisfying that 
demandingstandard. It is entirely plausible that tax credits 
wererestricted to state Exchanges deliberately-for example, in order to 
encourage States to establish their own Exchanges. We therefore have no 
authority to dismiss theterms of the law as a drafting fumble.Let us not 
forget that the term "Exchange established by the State" appears twice in 
36B and five more times in other parts of the Act that mention tax 
credits. What are the odds, do you think, that the same slip of the pen 
occurred in seven separate places? No provision of the Act-none at 
all-contradicts the limitation of tax credits to state Exchanges. And as I 
have already explained, uses of

18 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the term "Exchange established by the State" beyond the context of tax 
credits look anything but accidental. Supra,at 6. If there was a mistake 
here, context suggests it was a substantive mistake in designing this part 
of the law, not a technical mistake in transcribing it.

V The Court's decision reflects the philosophy that judgesshould endure 
whatever interpretive distortions it takes inorder to correct a supposed 
flaw in the statutory machinery. That philosophy ignores the American 
people's decision to give Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers" enumerated 
in the Constitution. Art. I, 1. They made Congress, notthis Court, 
responsible for both making laws and mendingthem. This Court holds only 
the judicial power-the power to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted 
it. We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do not work out in 
practice, just as the people lack the ability to throwus out of office if 
they dislike the solutions we concoct. We must always remember, therefore, 
that "[o]ur task is toapply the text, not to improve upon it." Pavelic & 
LeFlore
v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U. S. 
120, 126 (1989).

Trying to make its judge-empowering approach seem respectful of 
congressional authority, the Court asserts that its decision merely 
ensures that the Affordable Care Act operates the way Congress "meant [it] 
to operate." Ante, at 17. First of all, what makes the Court so sure that 
Congress "meant" tax credits to be available everywhere? Our only evidence 
of what Congress meant comesfrom the terms of the law, and those terms 
show beyondall question that tax credits are available only on 
stateExchanges. More importantly, the Court forgets that oursis a 
government of laws and not of men. That means we are governed by the terms 
of our laws, not by the unenacted will of our lawmakers. "If Congress 
enacted into law

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 19

SCALIA, J., dissenting

something different from what it intended, then it should amend the 
statute to conform to its intent." Lamie, supra, at 542. In the meantime, 
this Court "has no roving license. . . to disregard clear language simply 
on the view that . . . Congress 'must have intended' something broader." 
Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).

Even less defensible, if possible, is the Court's claim that its 
interpretive approach is justified because this Act"does not reflect the 
type of care and deliberation that onemight expect of such significant 
legislation." Ante, at 14-
15. It is not our place to judge the quality of the care and deliberation 
that went into this or any other law. A law enacted by voice vote with no 
deliberation whatever isfully as binding upon us as one enacted after 
years ofstudy, months of committee hearings, and weeks of debate. Much 
less is it our place to make everything comeout right when Congress does 
not do its job properly. It is up to Congress to design its laws with 
care, and it is up tothe people to hold them to account if they fail to 
carry outthat responsibility.

Rather than rewriting the law under the pretense of interpreting it, the 
Court should have left it to Congress todecide what to do about the Act's 
limitation of tax credits to state Exchanges. If Congress values above 
everythingelse the Act's applicability across the country, it could make 
tax credits available in every Exchange. If it prizesstate involvement in 
the Act's implementation, it could continue to limit tax credits to state 
Exchanges while taking other steps to mitigate the economic consequences 
predicted by the Court. If Congress wants to accommodate both goals, it 
could make tax credits available everywhere while offering new incentives 
for States to set up their own Exchanges. And if Congress thinks that the 
present design of the Act works well enough, it could do nothing. Congress 
could also do something else alto- gether, entirely abandoning the 
structure of the Affordable

20 KING v. BURWELL

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Care Act. The Court's insistence on making a choice thatshould be made by 
Congress both aggrandizes judicial power and encourages congressional 
lassitude.

Just ponder the significance of the Court's decision totake matters into 
its own hands. The Court's revision of the law authorizes the Internal 
Revenue Service to spend tens of billions of dollars every year in tax 
credits on federal Exchanges. It affects the price of insurance for 
millions of Americans. It diminishes the participation of the States in 
the implementation of the Act. It vastly expandsthe reach of the Act's 
individual mandate, whose scopedepends in part on the availability of 
credits. What a parody today's decision makes of Hamilton's assurances to 
the people of New York: "The legislature not only commands the purse but 
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are 
to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over . . 
. the purse; no direction . . . of the wealth of society, and cantake no 
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor 
WILL but merely judgment." The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961).

* * * Today's opinion changes the usual rules of statutory interpretation 
for the sake of the Affordable Care Act.That, alas, is not a novelty. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, 
this Court revised major components of the statute in order to save them 
from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congresspassed provides that every 
individual "shall" maintain insurance or else pay a "penalty." 26 U. S. C. 
5000A. This Court, however, saw that the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize a federal mandate to buy health insurance.So it rewrote the 
mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567

U. S., at ___-___ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 15-45). The Act that 
Congress passed also requires every State to

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 21

SCALIA, J., dissenting

accept an expansion of its Medicaid program, or else risk losing all 
Medicaid funding. 42 U. S. C. 1396c. This Court, however, saw that the 
Spending Clause does not authorize this coercive condition. So it rewrote 
the law to withhold only the incremental funds associated with the 
Medicaid expansion. 567 U. S., at ___-___ (principal opinion) (slip op., 
at 45-58). Having transformed twomajor parts of the law, the Court today 
has turned its attention to a third. The Act that Congress passed makes 
tax credits available only on an "Exchange established bythe State." This 
Court, however, concludes that this limitation would prevent the rest of 
the Act from working as well as hoped. So it rewrites the law to make tax 
credits available everywhere. We should start calling this law SCOTUScare.
Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Actwill attain the 
enduring status of the Social Security Act or the Taft-Hartley Act; 
perhaps not. But this Court's two decisions on the Act will surely be 
remembered through the years. The somersaults of statutory interpretation 
they have performed ("penalty" means tax, "further [Medicaid] payments to 
the State" means only incremental Medicaid payments to the State, 
"established by the State"means not established by the State) will be 
cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence.And 
the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme 
Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared 
to do whatever it takesto uphold and assist its favorites.
I dissent.


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.

Please Ignore All Links to JIGLU
in search results for Net-Gold and related lists.
The Net-Gold relationship with JIGLU has
been terminated by JIGLU and these are dead links.
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Temple University Listserv Alert :
Years 2009 and 2010 Eliminated from Archives
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.

.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES : Syllabus : KING ET AL. v. BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.

HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: A Health Care Expert Explained The Obamacare Decision On Reddit

.

.
HEALTH CARE REFORM :

UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY :

INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM :

LIBRETARIANISM :

MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID :

HEALTH INSURANCE :

LAW: CASE: DECISIONS:

A Health Care Expert Explained The Obamacare Decision On Reddit

.

.

A Health Care Expert Explained The Obamacare Decision On Reddit

The Huffington Post

By Erin Schumaker

Posted: 06/26/2015 1:06 pm EDT

Updated: 06/26/2015 1:59 pm EDT

Huffington Post

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/26/
reddit-obamacare-expert-ben-sommers-convo_n_7664762.html

.

A shorter URL for the above link:

.

http://tinyurl.com/nodrhf7

.

.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Affordable Care Act on Thursday,
preserving nationwide tax subsidies to help poor and middle-class
Americans retain full coverage under the exchange system. The 6-to-3
ruling saved as many as 8.2 million people from losing their health care
coverage, according to a report by the Urban Institute.

.

Though the Obamacare ruling affects many, the complexity of the case makes
its impact hard to grasp. So Ben Sommers, an assistant professor of health
policy and economics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and
one of the foremost researchers on the Affordable Care Act, took to Reddit
to answer questions about what the Supreme Court decision means for the
country and the consumer.

.

Here are the five biggest takeaways:

.

snip

.

.

Topics Covered in This Article:

.

More people say the Affordable Care Act has helped rather than hurt them
— even in conservative states.

Overall, the Affordable Care Act is saving the U.S. money.

Expanding Medicaid in every state would make the Affordable Care Act more
effective.

High-deductible “bronze plans” aren’t perfect, but they are better than
not having insurance at all.

Households with mixed immigration statuses present a roadblock to Latino
enrollment.

.

.

The Impact Of State Policies On ACA Applications And Enrollment Among
Low-Income Adults In Arkansas, Kentucky, And Texas
Health Affairs, June 2015 34:61010-1018

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/34/6/1010.full.pdf

.

.

Science AMA Series: Im Ben Sommers, Assistant Professor of Health Policy
and Economics at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. I research the
Affordable Care Act and access to care, and Im here to talk about it. AMA!

The New Reddit

Journal of Science

https://www.reddit.com/r/science/comments/3b2cdy/
science_ama_series_im_ben_sommers_assistant/
?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Chan-Twitter-General

OR

http://tinyurl.com/pecorae

.

.

The complete articles may be read at the URLs provided for each.

.

.

Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 – 4584
jwne@temple.edu
http://workface.com/e/daviddillard

Net-Gold
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/net-gold
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/net-gold.html
https://groups.io/org/groupsio/Net-Gold/archives
http://net-gold.3172864.n2.nabble.com/

Research Guides
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AND
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Educator-Gold
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PUBLIC HEALTH RESOURCES INCLUDING EBOLA
http://guides.temple.edu/public-health-guide

Blog
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Articles by David Dillard
https://sites.google.com/site/daviddillardsarticles/

Information Literacy (Russell Conwell Center Guide)
http://tinyurl.com/78a4shn

Nina Dillard’s Photographs on Net-Gold
http://www.flickr.com/photos/neemers/

Twitter: davidpdillard

Temple University Site Map
https://sites.google.com/site/templeunivsitemap/home

Bushell, R. & Sheldon, P. (eds),
Wellness and Tourism: Mind, Body, Spirit,
Place, New York: Cognizant Communication Books.
Wellness Tourism: Bibliographic and Webliographic Essay
David P. Dillard
http://tinyurl.com/p63whl

RailTram Discussion Group
From the Union Pacific to BritRail and Beyond
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/railtram/info

INDOOR GARDENING
Improve Your Chances for Indoor Gardening Success
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/IndoorGardeningUrban/

SPORT-MED
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http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sports-med/
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/sport-med.html

HEALTH DIET FITNESS RECREATION SPORTS TOURISM
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/healthrecsport/info
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/health-recreation-sports-tourism.html

.

.

Please Ignore All Links to JIGLU
in search results for Net-Gold and related lists.
The Net-Gold relationship with JIGLU has
been terminated by JIGLU and these are dead links.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Net-Gold/message/30664
http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group/healthrecsport/message/145
Temple University Listserv Alert :
Years 2009 and 2010 Eliminated from Archives
https://sites.google.com/site/templeuniversitylistservalert/

.

.

HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: A Health Care Expert Explained The Obamacare Decision On Reddit

HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: Post-Supreme Court, GOP Faces Steep Odds for Obamacare Repeal

.

.
HEALTH CARE REFORM :

UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY :

INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM :

LIBRETARIANISM :

MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID :

HEALTH INSURANCE :

LAW: CASE: DECISIONS:

Post-Supreme Court, GOP Faces Steep Odds for Obamacare Repeal

.

.

Post-Supreme Court, GOP Faces Steep Odds for Obamacare Repeal

By Deirdre Walsh

CNN

Updated 3:17 PM ET, Thu June 25, 2015

http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/politics/
obamacare-supreme-court-repeal-republicans-gop/

.

A shorter URL for the above link:

.

http://tinyurl.com/pkxrudb

.

.

Washington (CNN)The U.S. Supreme Court dealt congressional Republicans’
efforts to roll back Obamacare a severe blow when it ruled to uphold the
all the law’s subsidies for low-income individuals to purchase insurance,
solidifying the health care law as a key part of President Barack Obama’s
legacy.

.

GOP leaders on Capitol Hill vowed to keep up the fight to dismantle
Obamacare, but the reality is they have virtually no path to get rid of
the law while Obama is still in the White House. Any bill they pass will
inevitably face a presidential veto.

.

Publicly Republicans criticized the high court’s ruling, but privately
many members were relieved they were not left with the herculean challenge
of coming up with a plan to fix the chaos in the health insurance market
if the court struck down the subsidies for millions of Americans.

.

House and Senate GOP leaders had developed a backup plan — legislation to
shift money to the states and continue the subsidies for those that
potentially could have lost care if the court ruled against the Obama
administration. But many conservatives blasted that proposal because it
essentially kept key pieces of the current law in place, so it was unclear
if that bill could pass.

.

In the wake of the ruling Republicans on Capitol Hill considered their
legislative options for doing away with the law.

.

Some Republicans quickly pointed to a procedural tool, known as
“reconciliation” that allows a bill to pass in the Senate with a simple
majority, taking away the Democrats’ expected filibuster on any bill to
take apart the health care law.

.

“I would anticipate that the focus would move in the direction of
repealing all of Obamacare that can be repealed through reconciliation,”
House Budget Committee Chairman Tom Price told reporters after the ruling
was released.

.

But House Speaker John Boehner insisted there was no decision yet on
whether or not the GOP would use that procedural option. He did repeat
Republicans still wanted to replace Obamacare though.

.

.

The complete article may be read at the URL above.

.

.

Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 – 4584
jwne@temple.edu
http://workface.com/e/daviddillard

Net-Gold
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/net-gold
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/net-gold.html
https://groups.io/org/groupsio/Net-Gold/archives
http://net-gold.3172864.n2.nabble.com/

Research Guides
http://tinyurl.com/qy3gq6g
AND
https://sites.google.com/site/researchguidesonsites/

RESEARCH PAPER WRITING
http://guides.temple.edu/research-papers
EMPLOYMENT
http://guides.temple.edu/employment-guide
INTERNSHIPS
http://guides.temple.edu/employment-internships
HOSPITALITY
http://guides.temple.edu/hospitality-guide
DISABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT
http://guides.temple.edu/c.php?g=134557
INDOOR GARDENING
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/IndoorGardeningUrban/info
Educator-Gold
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Educator-Gold/
K12ADMINLIFE
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/K12AdminLIFE/

PUBLIC HEALTH RESOURCES INCLUDING EBOLA
http://guides.temple.edu/public-health-guide

Blog
https://educatorgold.wordpress.com/

Articles by David Dillard
https://sites.google.com/site/daviddillardsarticles/

Information Literacy (Russell Conwell Center Guide)
http://tinyurl.com/78a4shn

Nina Dillard’s Photographs on Net-Gold
http://www.flickr.com/photos/neemers/

Twitter: davidpdillard

Temple University Site Map
https://sites.google.com/site/templeunivsitemap/home

Bushell, R. & Sheldon, P. (eds),
Wellness and Tourism: Mind, Body, Spirit,
Place, New York: Cognizant Communication Books.
Wellness Tourism: Bibliographic and Webliographic Essay
David P. Dillard
http://tinyurl.com/p63whl

RailTram Discussion Group
From the Union Pacific to BritRail and Beyond
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/railtram/info

INDOOR GARDENING
Improve Your Chances for Indoor Gardening Success
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/IndoorGardeningUrban/

SPORT-MED
https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/sport-med.html
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sports-med/
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/sport-med.html

HEALTH DIET FITNESS RECREATION SPORTS TOURISM
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/healthrecsport/info
http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/health-recreation-sports-tourism.html

.

.

Please Ignore All Links to JIGLU
in search results for Net-Gold and related lists.
The Net-Gold relationship with JIGLU has
been terminated by JIGLU and these are dead links.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Net-Gold/message/30664
http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group/healthrecsport/message/145
Temple University Listserv Alert :
Years 2009 and 2010 Eliminated from Archives
https://sites.google.com/site/templeuniversitylistservalert/

.

.

HEALTH CARE REFORM : UNITED STATES: POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES: REPUBLICAN PARTY, TEA PARTY : INDUSTRIES: PETROLEUM : LIBRETARIANISM : MEDICAL INSURANCE: MEDICAID : HEALTH INSURANCE : LAW: CASE: DECISIONS: Post-Supreme Court, GOP Faces Steep Odds for Obamacare Repeal